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TAXATION
Craig D. Bell*
This article reviews significant recent developments in the
law affecting Virginia taxation. The article is divided into six
sections. Each of these sections covers the recent judicial deci-
sions and legislative changes which have occurred over the past
several years for the respective category of taxation discussed
in the section. The discussion of legislative activities will gener-
ally cover the 1995 and 1996 Sessions of the Virginia General
Assembly. The judicial decisions reviewed in this article are
primarily from the years 1995 and 1996. The overall purpose of
this article is to provide Virginia tax and general practitioners
with a concise overview of the recent developments in Virginia
taxation most likely to have an impact on Virginia practitio-
ners. The article is not designed to discuss or review all issues
of Virginia taxation. This article will not discuss many of the
numerous legislative technical changes to the State Taxation
Code of Title 58.1.
* President and Managing Director, Eure, Kincer & Bell, P.C., Richmond, Vir-
ginia. B.S. (Management, magna cum laude, with honors in Transportation and Dis-
tribution Management), 1979, Syracuse University; M.B.A., 1980, Syracuse University;,
J.D., 1983, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law;, LL.M. (Taxation),
1986, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. Mr. Bell concen-
trates his practice on state and local taxation, civil and criminal tax litigation, gener-
al tax planning, and business law. He is also an adjunct professor of State and Local
Tax for the Virginia Commonwealth University's Masters in Taxation program. Mr.
Bell serves on the Board of Governors and as vice-chair of the Virginia State Bar's
Section on Taxation.
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PART ONE: TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
I. INCOME TAx
A. Recent Judicial Decisions
1. Income Tax Credits
In Giesecke v. Department of Taxation,' the Fairfax County
Circuit Court held that husband and wife shareholders in a
Delaware corporation were not entitled to a credit against their
Virginia income tax liability on certain corporate franchise
taxes paid to the District of Columbia.2 Hans Giesecke was a
shareholder in a Delaware subchapter S corporation. The corpo-
ration was located within the District of Columbia, where it
was assessed and to which it paid certain corporate franchise
taxes. On their personal Virginia income tax returns for tax
years 1989 and 1990, the Gieseckes treated the corporate
franchise taxes paid to the District of Columbia as an income
tax and claimed credits for those payments under Virginia Code
section 58.1-332.' The Department of Taxation disallowed the
credits and assessed the Gieseckes with additional taxes for the
1989 and 1990 tax years. The Gieseckes paid the taxes under
protest and initiated a motion for declaratory judgment which
the Fairfax County Circuit Court denied.4
The Gieseckes relied on the Supreme Court of Virginia deci-
sion in King v. Forst' for support of their position that the
District of Columbia corporate franchise taxes should be treated
as income taxes for purposes of the credit available under Vir-
ginia Code section 58.1-332. In King, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that the District of Columbia's unincorporated busi-
ness tax was an income tax for purposes of the section 58.1-332
credit.6 The Fairfax County Circuit Court noted that the Dis-
1. 34 Va. Cir. 455 (Fairfax County 1994).
2. Id. at 456.
3. Id. at 455.
4. Id. at 456.
5. 239 Va. 557, 391 S.E.2d 60 (1990).
6. Id. at 561, 391 S.E.2d at 62.
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trict of Columbia's corporate franchise tax is not the same as
an unincorporated business tax, although arguably the logic of
the King holding would appear to apply equally to both types of
taxes.7 The Fairfax County Circuit Court did not locate any
Virginia court decision or Department of Taxation ruling which
treated the corporate franchise tax paid to the District of Co-
lumbia as an income tax under Virginia tax laws governing
credits to be given for out-of-state tax payments.8
Prior to the King decision, the Department of Taxation had
consistently taken the position that unincorporated business
taxes, and other analogous taxes paid to the District of Colum-
bia, did not qualify for the credit which was ultimately allowed
by the supreme court in King.9 Following the supreme court's
decision in King, the legislature adopted a retroactive amend-
ment to Virginia Code section 58.1-332 which explicitly incorpo-
rated the Department of Taxation's interpretation of the statute
regarding the allowance and disallowance of credits to Virginia
taxpayers for taxes paid to other states.10 The amendment spe-
cifically provided that "no franchise tax, license tax, excise tax,
unincorporated business tax, occupation tax or any tax charac-
terized as such by the taxing jurisdiction, although applied to
earned or business income, shall qualify for a credit under this
section ...... The only exception made to the amendment's
retrospective reach was for taxpayers who had paid taxes to
Virginia without applying the credit, and who had filed a pro-
tective claim for refund with the Department of Taxation prior
to the date of the introduction of the amending bill.'
The Gieseckes challenged the impact of the amendment argu-
ing that it was an unconstitutional retroactive application of
law. The Fairfax County Circuit Court stated that retroactive
application of tax statutes does not necessarily make the laws
unconstitutional.' In cases where the due process of law is
infringed, the retroactive aspect of the law will be deemed in-
7. Giesecke, 34 Va. Cir. at 456.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 457.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-332(A) (Repl. VoL 1991).
12. Giesecke, 34 Va. Cir. at 458.
13. Id. at 458.
19961 1545
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1543
valid. The circuit court noted that there was no denial of due
process.' The Fairfax County Circuit Court found that the
amendment to Virginia Code section 58.1-332 does not impair
any contractual obligations nor does it abrogate any vested
rights of the taxpayers." Specifically, the circuit court stated
that "[nlo one has the vested right to be free of taxation, nor
does he have the constitutional right to know that a tax will be
levied in such a manner that he may avoid it.'""
The application of the due process analysis to taxation has
two tests. First, should the taxpayer reasonably have known
that the statute at issue would be amended with retroactive
application as to them?'7 Second, is the period for retroactive
application of a statute reasonable? 8 The Fairfax County Cir-
cuit Court held that the amendment to Virginia Code section
58.1-332 withstands constitutional challenge under both tests.'
As to the first test, the evidence established that the Gieseckes
should have known that the challenged statute would be
amended and would subject them to the tax.2" In fact, it ap-
peared to the circuit court that the taxpayers knew of the legis-
lative action and its probable effect on them prior to claiming
the credit for tax year 1989 on their 1990 tax form, and in the
subsequent year under challenge.2 ' With regard to the second
test, the circuit court noted that retroactive tax statutes have
been upheld against due process challenge when the retroactive
period is relatively short. In this case, a three-year retroac-
tive application was found to be reasonable under the facts
presented by the taxpayers.
The Fairfax County Circuit Court relied heavily upon the
timing of the amendment by the Virginia legislature. The
amendment to Virginia Code section 58.1-332 was completed at
the General Assembly's first regular session after the supreme
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 459.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 460.
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court's decision in King.'4 The actual period of retroactive ap-
plication of the amendment was short and reasonable given the
legislature's quick action to legislatively overrule the King deci-
sion. The circuit court also noted that the Virginia legislature
did not create "wholly new law," to which the taxpayers were
subjected contrary to the legitimate expectations of finality and
reposeY Rather, the amendment codified the position which
the Department of Taxation had consistently taken with respect
to all Virginia taxpayers on the issue of available credits since
1957.26
2. Virginia Additions and Subtractions-Individuals
In Davenport v. Department of Taxation,27 the Circuit Court
for the City of Richmond held that a parent's election to include
his or her child's unearned income in the parent's gross income
for federal income tax purposes did not make such income a
part of the parent's Virginia taxable income.28 Section 1(g) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,29 as amended, is commonly
known as the "Kiddie Tax," and "generally provides that 'the
unearned income of a child under the age of [fourteen years] is
taxed by the federal government at the tax rate applicable to
the child's parents if the parents file jointly, at the rate of the
parent with the greater income if the parents file separately, or
at the rate of the custodial parent if the parents are not mar-
ried to each other."0
For tax years 1992, 1993 and 1994, Mr. Davenport's five
minor children had unearned income. The Davenports filed a
joint federal tax return on which they elected to include in
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The Gieseckes' Petition for Appeal was denied by the supreme court in
1995. Giesecke v. Department of Taxation, No. 950166 (Va. April 13, 1995), denying
appeal from 34 Va. Cir. 455 (Fairfax County 1994). In House Bill 2047, the 1995
General Assembly was asked to consider amending section 58.1-332(A) to broaden the
income tax credit available for taxes paid to other states. H.B. 2047, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly (Reg. Sess. 1995) House Bill 2047, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1995) was not
enacted by the Virginia legislature.
27. 38 Va. Cir. 421 (Richmond City 1996).
28. Id. at 421.
29. 26 U.S.C. § 1(g) (1994).
30. Davenport, 38 Va. Cir. at 421.
1996] 1547TAXATION
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1543
their gross income the unearned income of their five minor
children. When the Davenports prepared their Virginia income
tax returns for those years, they subtracted their children's
unearned income from their federal adjusted gross income as
reported on their federal tax returns.
At trial, the Virginia Department of Taxation argued that
section 58.1-322 defines "Virginia taxable income" and sets out
a rather complete list of items which must be added to, or
which may be deducted from, a taxpayer's federal adjusted
gross income in order to arrive at the taxpayer's Virginia tax-
able income."' A deduction of the children's unearned income
is not one of the items listed as an available subtraction from a
taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income. 2 The Department of
Taxation also argued that on two occasions the General Assem-
bly considered, but voted against, amending section 58.1-322 to
specifically provide for an exclusion of a child's unearned in-
come from the parent's Virginia taxable income, even if such
income was included on the parent's federal income tax re-
turn.3 While the circuit court noted that both arguments were
compelling and logical, it rejected both of them.' Section 58.1-
322(A) provides that "[t]he Virginia taxable income of a resident
individual means his federal adjusted gross income for the
taxable year ... with the modification specified in this sec-
tion."35 The circuit court stated that, "regardless of where a
child's income is reported, it remains the income of the child. It
simply is not the income of the parent."6
31. Id. at 422.
32. -Id.
33. Id. at 423 (citing H.B. 1556, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1991); S.B. 216,
Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1992)).
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 424. The Tax Department's Petition for Appeal was granted by the
Supreme Court of Virginia. Department of Taxation v. Davenport, No. 961270 (Va.
Sept. 5, 1996), granting appeal from 38 Va. Cir. 421 (Richmond City 1996). Oral
argument on this case will likely be held in early 1997.
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3. Corporate Income Tax-Foreign Corporations
In National Private Truck Council v. Department of Taxa-
tion,'7 the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria granted
summary judgment to the National Private Truck Council on
its claim that a Virginia corporate income tax regulation, sec-
tion 630-3-401(G),38 violates 15 U.S.C. section 381,"9 as well
as the Due Process0 and Commerce Clauses41 of the United
States Constitution. These two provisions of the Constitution,
require that before a state may tax a person, property or
transaction there must be some minimum "nexus" between the
state and the person, property or transaction sought to be
taxed.4 ' To implement and amplify these protections to busi-
nesses operating in interstate commerce, Congress, in 1959,
enacted Public Law 86-272.' This statute limits the power of
states to impose net income taxes on out-of-state businesses. It
provides in pertinent part:
No state... shall have power to impose ... a net income
tax on the income derived within such State by any person
from interstate commerce if the only business activities
within such State by or on behalf of such person...
are... :
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person...
in such State for sales of tangible personal prop-
erty, which orders are sent outside the State for
approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled
by shipment or delivery from a point outside the
State ....
The National Private Truck Council, Inc.-a national trade
association consisting of over 1,000 companies that manufac-
ture, distribute, and transport their products in their own
37. 37 Va. Cir. 334 (Alexandria City 1996) (appeal granted).
38. 23 VA. ADMn. CODE 10-120-90(G) (1996) (formerly VRR 630-3-401(G)).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994).
40. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
43. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994)).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1994).
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trucks-opposed the Department of Taxation's regulation which
sought to implement Virginia Code section 58.1-400. Virginia
Code section 58.1-400 imposes an income tax on "every corpora-
tion organized under the laws of the Commonwealth and every
foreign corporation having income from Virginia sources.'
Section 630-3-401 of the Virginia Regulations sets out certain
"income from Virginia sources" which is exempted or excluded
from the state income tax.' Subsection 630-3-401(G) provides
in pertinent part:
(G) Limitation on jurisdiction to tax.
(1) Federal law prohibits any state from imposing
a net income tax on a foreign corporation having
no place of business within the state, whose sole
activity within the state is solicitation of orders
which are accepted and filled by shipment via
common carrier from places outside the state. See
Public Law 86-272 (15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384) for full
details and definitions.
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided Wisconsin
Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr. Co.,' which
discussed the parameters of "solicitation" and ancillary activities
protected under 15 U.S.C. section 381. Subsequent to Wrigley,
the Department of Taxation issued a new policy holding that
"the operation of a taxpayer's trucks on Virginia highways
clearly exceed[ed] 'solicitation' under P[ublic] L[aw] [No.] 86-
272.""9 Furthermore, because the use of a taxpayer's own
trucks will create nexus with the state, the taxpayer will now
be required to file a Virginia income tax return for taxable
years beginning after the date of the new policy.59
The National Private Truck Council directly challenged the
Department of Taxation's conclusion that companies are protect-
ed from state income taxation by section 381 if they use com-
mon carriers to ship their products into Virginia, but not if
they deliver those products to their Virginia customers in their
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-400 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
46. 23 VA. ADMIN. CODE 10-120-90 (1996) (formerly VRR 630-3-401).
47. 23 VA. ADMIN. CODE 10-120-90(G) (1996) (formerly VRR 630-3401(G)).
48. 505 U.S. 214 (1992).
49. VmiGmA DEP'T TAXATION, PuB. DoC. 92-230 (November 9, 1992).
50. Id.
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own vehicles. The petitioners argued that the Department's
position is at odds with the plain language of the statute and
its legislative history. The circuit court agreed, concluding that
the clear and plain meaning of section 381 is that states may
not impose a net income tax on out-of-state corporations whose
only contact with the taxing state consists of soliciting orders
and delivering goods in the corporation's own vehicles.5' To
hold otherwise would be contrary to Congress' intention in
using the terms "shipment or delivery" and "by or on behalf
of."5
2
B. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Income Tax Credits
a. Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit Expansion
In 1995, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-439 to accomplish several modifications to the Major
Business Facility Job Tax Credit. 3 First, the legislation elimi-
nated the one-million dollar limitation on the maximum amount
of credit which a taxpayer may cumulatively earn.' Second,
the period during which unused credits may be carried over
was increased from five to ten years.55 In 1996, the General
Assembly again amended section 58.1-439 to require the De-
partment of Taxation to certify those companies which qualify
for the Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit and determine
the classification of these facilities. 5 Prior to this amendment,
51. National Private Truck Council v. Department of Taxation, 37 Va. Cir. 334,
334 (Alexandria City 1996).
52. Id.
53. Act of March 18, 1995, ch. 365, 1995 Va. Acts 515.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439(H) (Cure. Supp. 1996).
55. Id.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439(E) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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the Department of Economic Development performed these
functions. 7
b. Clean Fuel Vehicle Job Creation Tax Credit
The 1995 General Assembly created a new corporate income
tax credit for the creation of full-time clean fuel vehicle jobs.58
For taxable years commencing on or after January 1, 1996
through December 31, 2006, a corporate income tax credit will
be available in the amount of $700 per new job created by a
corporation engaged in certain manufacturing activities that are
related to clean fuel vehicles. 9 This $700 income tax credit
can also be used in each of the two succeeding years that the
job is continued, for a maximum "per job" credit of $2,100.60
To be eligible for the credit, a corporation must create a new
job for an employee whose primary work activity is the manu-
facture of components for clean fuel vehicles, the manufacture
of components used to convert gasoline or diesel to clean fuel
vehicles, the manufacture of vehicles designed to operate on
clean special fuel, or the conversion of gasoline or diesel fuel
vehicles to vehicles that operate on clean special fuel."'
Full-time employment for the purposes of the clean fuel vehi-
cle job creation tax credit means at least forty hours per week
during at least forty weeks of a calendar year.62 The definition
of 'Job" for purposes of the clean fuel vehicle job creation tax
credit also requires that the employee's primary work activity
be related to one of the specified clean fuel vehicle manufactur-
ing or conversion activities." In addition, a corporation must
demonstrate that it has increased the number of eligible jobs in
the tax year for which the credit is claimed in comparison to
the previous taxable year." "Any tax credit not used in the
taxable year of job creation or continuation may be carried over
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439(E) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
63. Id.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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for credit against the corporation's income tax in the five suc-
ceeding taxable years until the total credit amount is used.""
The legislation is drafted so that a corporation will not be per-
mitted to claim the clean fuel vehicle tax credit for jobs for
which the taxpayer also claims the Major Business Facility Job
Tax Credit."
c. Coalfield Employment Enhancement Tax Credit
The 1995 General Assembly created a new income tax credit
for Virginia producers of coal and coal methane gas by creating
section 58.1-439.2."' Coal producers may begin earning these
credits in taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1996,
but may not begin utilizing these credits until January 1,
1999.' The tax credits are due to expire on January 1,
2002.9
Virginia coal producers may claim one of two tax credits
depending on the method of mining of the coal."0 Under the
1995 legislation, coal which is mined by underground methods
would permit a credit equal to sixty cents per ton if the seam
thickness is under thirty-three inches, and fifty cents per ton if
the seam thickness is thirty-three inches and above.' Seam
thickness is based on the weighted average isopach mapping of
actual coal thickness by mine, as certified by a professional
engineer. 2 For coal mined by surface mining methods, the
1995 version of this credit was equal to twenty-five cents per
ton for coal sold in 1996 and each year thereafter."
In 1996, Virginia legislators made several significant amend-
ments to the coalfield employment enhancement tax credit. The
1996 legislation increased the amount of the credit for both
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.1(G) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(E) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996). The original sunset provi-
sion for the credit was set to expire by January 1, 2001. The 1996 General Assembly
delayed the credit's expiration date to on or before January 1, 2002. Id.
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(A)(1), (A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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surface and underground mining and modified the seam thick-
ness criteria for determining the credit for underground min-
ing.74 For coal mined by underground methods, a taxpayer will
now be entitled to a credit equal to one dollar per ton if the
seam thickness is more than thirty-six inches, and two dollars
per ton if the seam thickness is thirty-six inches and under.75
For coal mined by surface methods, the credit will now be
equal to forty cents per ton for coal sold in 1996 and each year
thereafter. 6
The credit that a taxpayer may claim is calculated by multi-
plying the amount of credit earned by the coal producer's em-
ployment factor.77 The employment factor is
the percentage obtained by dividing the total number of
coal mining jobs of the person filing the return, including
the jobs of contract operators of such person as reflected by
the annual tonnage reports filed with the Department of
Mines, Minerals and Energy for the year in which the cred-
it was earned by the total number of coal mining jobs of
such persons or operators as reflected in the annual ton-
nage reports for the year immediately prior to the year in
which the credit was earned.78
The credit must be claimed according to a schedule which is set
forth within the coalfield employment enhancement tax credit
statute.79
The 1996 amendment to section 58.1-439.2 also requires the
Tax Commissioner to redeem unused credits for ninety percent
of the credit amount." The remaining ten percent of unused
credit is provided for a regional economic development fund
which is to be administered by the Coalfields Economic Devel-
opment Authority.8'
74. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-439.2(A)(1), (A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(A)(2) (Cure. Supp. 1996).
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(F) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
78. Id.
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(G) (Cure. Supp. 1996).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
81. Id.
1554
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d. Qualifying Steam Producers Tax Credit
The 1995 General Assembly created Virginia Code section
58.1-439.3 which provides a tax credit for steam producers."
The amount of the Qualifying Steam Producers Tax Credit is
three dollars per ton for each ton of coal mined in Virginia that
the steam producer purchases for tax years beginning on and
after January 1, 1996, but before January 1, 2001.83 A "steam
producer" is defined as a corporation that sells steam energy to
a manufacturing company in Virginia or uses steam to produce
manufactured goods.' The credit allowed may not exceed the
total amount of the Steam Producer's tax liability.' Any tax
credit not useable for the taxable year may be carried over for
up to five succeeding tax years or until the full credit is used,
whichever is sooner.86
e. Enterprise Zone Program Revamped
The 1995 General Assembly substantially revised and amend-
ed Virginia's Enterprise Zone Program.' A number of these
changes are significant. The maximum number of enterprise
zones which may be designated was doubled from twenty-five to
fifty.' Urban localities can apply for up to three zones.89 Ru-
ral localities with population densities of less than 150 persons
per square mile can apply for two zones, one of which may be
subdivided into two parts." The subdivided zone will be con-
sidered one zone."
Another significant change to the Virginia Enterprise Zone
Program was to modify the eligibility criteria of a "qualified
business firm." Under the 1995 legislation, to be eligible to
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.3 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-274(B) (Cum- Supp. 1996).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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receive the various tax credits and incentives, a business firm
must first be designated as a qualified business firm.92 Such
entity must:
(i) . . . establish[ ] within an enterprise zone a trade or
business not previously conducted in [Virginia] by such
taxpayer, and
(ii) forty percent or more of the employees employed at
the business firm's establishment or establishments located
within the enterprise zone [must] either have incomes below
eighty percent of the median income for the jurisdiction
prior to employment or [be] residents of the [enterprise]
zone.
93
A qualified business firm also includes a taxpayer who is
actively engaged in the conduct of a trade or business in an
area immediately prior to that area being designated an enter-
prise zone and that increases the average number of full-time
employees employed at the business firm's establishment or
establishments located within the enterprise zone by at least
ten percent over the lower of the preceding two year's employ-
ment, with no less than forty percent of such increase being
employees who either have incomes below eighty percent of the
median income for the jurisdiction prior to employment or are
residents of the zone.94 Current employees of the business firm
that are transferred directly to the enterprise zone facility from
another site within the state, resulting in a net loss of employ-
ment at that site, shall not be included in calculating the in-
crease in the average number of full-time employees employed
by the business firm within the enterprise zone.95
The legislation also permits any business firm to be designat-
ed as a "qualified business firm" if it is actively engaged in the
conduct of a trade or business in Virginia and relocates to be-
gin operation of a trade or business within an enterprise zone,
and if it increases the average number of full-time employees
employed at the business firm's establishment or establishments
within the enterprise zone by at least ten percent over the
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-279(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
93. Id.
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-279(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
95. Id.
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lower of the preceding two year's employment of the business
firm prior to relocation with no less than fifMy percent of such
increase being employees who either have incomes below eighty
percent of the median income for the jurisdiction prior to em-
ployment or are residents of the zone. 6
Also, the 1995 legislation also substantially revamped and
revised the various tax credits available to a qualifring busi-
ness firm. With respect to the business income tax credit, the
total amount of tax credits available to any qualified business
firm and to the qualified zone residents may not exceed five
million dollars for each fiscal year.9" This limitation applies to
both corporate income and individual income tax credits.98
However, tax credits granted under section 59.1-280 to firms
designated as qualified business firms prior to July 1, 1995,
will not be subject to the five million dollar limitation.9
If a qualified business firm makes qualified zone invest-
ments' in excess of twenty-five million dollars and such
qualified zone investments result in the creation of at least 100
full-time positions, the percentage amounts of the income tax
credits available to such qualified business firms must be estab-
lished by agreement between the Department of Taxation and
the qualified business firm.' The agreement will not permit
percentage amounts of tax credits to exceed the percentages
allowed to other qualified business firms in section 59.1-
280(A)."2 Generally, these percentages provide a business in-
come tax credit equal to eighty percent of taxes due Virginia for
year one and sixty percent of taxes due for years two through
ten (up to five million dollars annually).0 3
The 1995 enterprise zone legislation repealed the credit
against various taxes, including personal income, corporate
income and franchise taxes, which could be taken by qualified
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-279(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280(A) (Cuam Supp. 1996).
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
100. Section 59.1-280.1(K) defines "qualified zone investments." VA. CODE ANN. §
59.1-280.1(K) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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business firms for unemployment taxes .paid.1°4 The new law
also phases out the sales and use tax exemption for qualified
business firms.0 5 As a compromise, those qualified business
firms currently possessing an exemption for sales and use taxes
are entitled to keep the exemption until the five-year period
runs out.' 6 "No business firm designated as a qualified busi-
ness firm on or after July 1, 1995, is entitled to receive an
exemption from sales and use taxes." °7
While several of the tax credits have been eliminated or
phased-out as a result of this legislation, the revamped enter-
prise zone program does create a real property investment tax
credit, cash grants for creating permanent full-time positions,
and certain other local incentives (i.e., reduced permit fees,
reduction of certain taxes, etc.). Beginning on July 1, 1995, but
before July 1, 2005, a taxpayer who is a qualified zone resident
will be allowed a tax credit against corporate, income, and
certain utility taxes, insurance license taxes, and bank fran-
chise taxes.' 8
With regard to the enterprise zone real property investment
tax credit, a refundable credit will be allowed in an amount
equalling thirty percent of the qualified zone improvements for
any qualified zone resident."9 However, in no event can the
cumulative credit allowed exceed $125,000 in any five-year peri-
od." The total amount of tax credits granted to qualified
zone residents under this statute, including qualified business
firms under section 59.1-280, shall not exceed five million dol-
lars for each fiscal year."'
A "qualified zone resident" means "an owner or tenant of real
property located in an enterprise zone who expands or rehabili-
tates such real property to facilitate the conduct of a trade or
business by such owner or tenant within the enterprise
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282 (Cure. Supp. 1996).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(B)(H) (Cure. Supp. 1996).
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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zone."" "Qualified zone improvements" means the amount
properly chargeable to a capital account for improvements to
rehabilitate or expand depreciable real property placed in ser-
vice during the taxable year within an enterprise zone, provided
that the total amount of such improvements equals or exceeds
both: (i) $50,000; and (ii) the assessed value of the original
facility immediately prior to the rehabilitation or expansion."
This statute is explicit regarding what may or may not qualify
as a "qualified zone improvement." Qualified zone improvement
expenditures are those expenditures associated with any exteri-
or, structural, mechanical, or electrical improvements necessary
to expand or rehabilitate a building for commercial or industrial
use and for excavations, grading, paving, driveways, roads,
sidewalks, landscaping, or other land improvements." Quali-
fied zone improvements also include, but are not limited to, the
costs associated with demolition, carpentry, sheetrock, plaster,
painting, ceilings, fixtures, doors, windows, fire suppression
systems, roofing and flashing, exterior repair, cleaning, and
cleanup."
5
Qualified zone improvements will not include the cost of
acquiring any real property or building."
Qualified zone improvements [will also] not include: (i) the
cost of furnishings; (ii) any expenditure associated with
appraisal, architectural, engineering, and interior design
fees; (iii) loan fees, points, or capitalized interest; (iv) legal,
accounting, realtor, sales and marketing, or other profes-
sional fees; (v) closing costs, permits, user fees, zoning fees,
impact fees, and inspection fees; (vi) bids, insurance,
signage, utilities, bonding, copying, rent loss, or temporary
facilities incurred during construction; (vii) utility hook-up
or access fees; (viii) outbuildings; or (ix) the cost of any well
or septic or sewer system."
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(D) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(E)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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A number of other restrictions also apply to determine the
eligibility of property or improvements to meet the definition of
qualified zone improvements."'
For purposes of the new real property investment tax credits,
the cost of any newly constructed depreciable non-residential
real property is considered a qualified zone improvement eligi-
ble for the credit if the total amount of such expenditures is at
least $250,000 for a single facility." Land, land improve-
ments, paving, grading, driveways, and interest shall not be
considered to be qualified zone improvements." °
The Virginia Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment must certify the nature and amount of qualified zone
improvements and investments eligible for credit in any taxable
year.'" Once properly certified, the Department of Taxation
will authorize the credit when it is provided with a copy of the
housing certification by the taxpayer.'
The 1995 legislation created additional tax credits for certain
large qualified zone investments in excess of $100 million and
in situations where the investments create at least 200 perma-
nent full-time positions.' In these situations, a qualified zone
resident is eligible for a credit of up to five percent of such
qualified zone investments in lieu of the credit provided by
section 59.1-281.1(B).' The actual percentage amount of the
investment tax credit granted to a qualified zone resident will
be determined by agreement between the Department of Taxa-
tion and the qualified zone resident.' The agreement may
not provide for a percentage amount exceeding five percent. 6
The total amount of tax credit granted under these circum-
stances shall not exceed three million dollars. 7 In addition,
the qualified investment tax credit cannot exceed the tax im-
118. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
120. Id.
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(G) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
122. Id.
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(J) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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posed for such taxable year, but any such credit not usable for
the taxable year generated may be carried forward until the
full amount of such credit has been utilized.'
This new enterprise zone program, with its myriad of tax
credits, requires the establishment of policies and procedures
for the reservation and allocation of tax credits. All qualified
business firms and qualified zone residents which are eligible to
receive any tax credit provided for by either sections 59.1-280
or 59.1-280.1 must reserve the tax credit through the Depart-
ment of Taxation.'
In order to ensure that the limited amounts of tax credits
available in any year are not oversubscribed and are allocated
in an orderly and equitable manner, the Virginia Board of
Housing and Community Development is required to establish
policies and procedures for the reservation of tax credits by
qualified business firms and qualified zone residents.13 These
policies and procedures must provide:
(i) requirements for applying for reservations of tax credits;
(ii) a system for allocating available amount of tax credits
among eligible applicants; (iii) for carrying forward eligi-
bility for tax credits to subsequent periods if an applicant
does not obtain a reservation of the tax credit or any por-
tion thereof for which he is eligible in any year as the re-
sult of the over subscription of tax credits; (iv) priorities for
allocating reservations to applicants whose eligibility for
reservations of tax credits was carried forward from a pre-
ceding year but who did not receive a credit to which they
were otherwise eligible; and (v) for the issuance of reserva-
tions to eligible applicants who did not initially receive a
reservation in any year, if the [Tax] Department determines
that tax credit reservations were issued to other applicants
who did not use, or were determined to be wholly or par-
tially ineligible for, a reserved tax credit.13
The Department of Taxation must apply these policies and
procedures when approving applications for reservations of such
128. Id.
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
131. Id.
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tax credits to qualified business firms and qualified zone resi-
dents.'' Actions by the Department of Taxation relating to
the approval or denial of applications for reservations for tax
credits under Virginia Code sections 59.1-280 or 59.1-280.1 are
exempt from the provisions of the Administrative Process
Act.1
Included within the package of legislation to revamp
Virginia's enterprise zone program was the creation of several
money grant programs. First, the legislation created a grant
program to promote increasing full-time permanent enterprise
zone employment for both business start-ups and expansions of
existing firms over 110% of base employment." The amount
of the grant for which a business firm is eligible will be equal
to "(i) $1,000 multiplied by the number of eligible positions
filled by employees whose permanent place of residence is with-
in the enterprise zone, and (ii) $500 multiplied by the number
of eligible positions filled by employees whose permanent place
of residence is outside of the enterprise zone."'3' In no event
will a business firm be eligible for a grant under this section in
excess of $100,000 for any grant year."'
Section 59.1-282.1 of the Virginia Code provides definitions
and eligibility criteria for the grants. A business firm is eligible
to receive enterprise zone incentive grants for the three calen-
dar years commencing with the first year of grant eligibili-
ty. '3 Any business firm receiving an enterprise zone incentive
grant under section 59.1-282.1 will not be eligible for the major
business facility job tax credit pursuant to section 58.1-439.'
The second grant program created by the 1995 legislation
package was the Enterprise Zone Grant Fund.139 This new
fund will be used solely for the payment of enterprise zone in-
centive grants to eligible business firms.' ° Appropriations to
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
136. See id.
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282.1(G) (Cum- Supp. 1996).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
140. Id.
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this fund must be made by the General Assembly.' The ap-
propriations will be limited to those purposes authorized under
section 59.1-282.2 for the incentive grants to business-firms.'
The Virginia Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment shall determine the amount of the grant to be allocated
to each eligible business firm.' A business that receives an
enterprise zone incentive grant may assign all or any portion of
an enterprise zone incentive grant to which it is eligible to the
owner of any real property within an enterprise zone occupied
by the business firm as tenant.' A business may also assign
an incentive grant to a financial institution regularly engaged
in the business of lending money that has made a loan to the
business firm for purposes of expanding, constructing, or reha-
bilitating a nonresidential building or facility for the conduct of
a trade or business by the business firm within an enterprise
zone, or both, as they may agree.' If such an assignment is
made, a business firm must notify the Virginia Department of
Housing and Community Development.'
The 1995 legislation revised the Enterprise Zone Act to au-
thorize localities to propose local tax incentives such as permit
and user fee reductions and the reduction of the business, pro-
fessional and occupation license tax.' Specifically, the legisla-
tion enables a locality to establish eligibility criteria for local
incentives to business firms that are the same as, or more
stringent than, the criteria for eligibility for grants or other
benefits.'
The legislation provides that the Virginia Department of
Housing and Community Development must periodically review
the effectiveness of state and local incentives in increasing
investment and employment in each enterprise zone, and report
annually its findings to the Senate Finance Committee, the
Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor, the House Finance
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282.2(B) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-282.3 (Cur. Supp. 1996).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-283(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-283(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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Committee, and the House Committee on Labor and Com-
merce." If no business firms in the enterprise zone have
qualified for the benefits provided under the legislation within
a five-year period, the Department shall terminate that enter-
prise zone designation.5 '
The revised Virginia Enterprise Zone Act will expire on July
1, 2005, unless extended by an Act of the General
Assembly.' 1
In 1996, the General Assembly fine-tuned the enterprise zone
program by establishing a statutory framework that will permit
the Governor of Virginia to waive a portion of the employment
criteria necessary to qualify for enterprise zone benefits as they
apply to the *pharmaceutical, health care and home care
products companies which are undertaking expansions for the
primary purpose of basic research or research and develop-
ment.52 The criteria that at least forty percent of new em-
ployees employed at a qualifying business either have incomes
below eighty percent of the area median income of the jurisdic-
tion prior to employment or are zone residents will be subject
to waiver." 3 A waiver, if granted, would apply to a particular
business and not to other businesses in the enterprise zone. 54
f. Day-Care Facility Investment Tax Credit
The 1996 General Assembly created a new investment tax
credit for any employer who establishes a licensed child day-
care center for the children of employees. 5 The credit is
equal to twenty-five percent of the cost of the facility, not to
exceed $25,000.' The total amount of credits allowed in any
fiscal year will be limited to $100,000.' Qualifying expendi-
tures for this new tax credit include those paid or incurred by
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-284(B) (Cum Supp. 1996).
150. Id.
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-284.01 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-279.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. VA. CODE A1N. § 58.1-4a9.4 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.4(B) (Cure. Supp. 1996).
157. Id.
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the taxpayer for "planning, site preparation, construction, reno-
vation, or acquisition of facilities for the purpose of establishing
a child day-care facility ... ."' Expenditures could also in-
clude equipment and kitchen appliances permanently installed
in or adjacent to the facility, provided that such equipment is
necessary to the functioning of the day-care facility."15 This
tax credit will be available for taxable years beginning on and
after January 1, 1997.160
g. Tax Credit for Rent Reductions Extended
The Virginia corporate and personal income tax credits avail-
able for rent reductions granted to low-income tenants who are
elderly and disabled has been extended until December 31,
1999.' 6' Prior to this extension, the credit was scheduled to
expire on December 31, 1996.162 The credit, however, will only
be available for units rented to qualifying tenants as of July 1,
1996, and would further be restricted to rent received from
tenants in residence as of July 1, 1996.' Beginning July 1,
1996, the total amount of approved tax credits may not exceed
$250,000 in any fiscal year."
The tax credit for rent reductions is available to landlords
engaged in the business of renting dwelling units and subject to
the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.' The Vir-
ginia Housing Development Authority certifies to the Depart-
ment of Taxation the individuals or corporations providing rent
reductions that qualify for the credit. If a qualifying landlord
provides rentals to low-income tenants who either exceed the
age of sixty-two or are disabled from a physical or mental con-
dition, and the rent charged is at least fifteen percent less than
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339 (Cum. Supp. 1996)
164. Id.
165. Id. The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act is located at Virginia
Code sections 55-248.2 to -248.40. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.2 to -248.40 (Repl. Vol.
1995 & Cum Supp. 1996).
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market value, a credit equal to fifty percent of the rental reduc-
tion is allowed to the landlord.166
h. Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit
The 1996 General Assembly enacted an income tax credit for
individuals, trusts and estates, and corporations equal to a
designated percentage of the eligible expenses incurred in reha-
bilitating certified historic structures." The percentage of ex-
penses qualifying for this new credit will be phased in as fol-
lows:
Year Percentage
1997 10 percent
1998 15 percent
1999 20 percent
2000 and thereafter 25 percent"
In order to qualify for this tax credit, the cost of the rehabili-
tation must equal at least fifty percent of the assessed value of
the building for local real estate tax purposes in the year prior
to the rehabilitation.'69 Certification for the credit must be ob-
tained from the Virginia Department of Historic Resources,
which will determine the amount of eligible expenses and issue
a certificate verifying the expenses.'70 For purposes of this tax
credit, a certified historic structure is a property listed on the
Virginia Landmarks Register or certified by the Director of the
Virginia Department of Historic Resources as contributing to
the significance of a historic district either listed on the Regis-
ter or certified as meeting the criteria for listing.'7'
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
168. Id.
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.2(C) (Cure. Supp. 1996).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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2. Foreign Sales Corporations
The 1995 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-401 to exempt foreign sales corporations ("FSC") and any
income properly attributable to an FSC under federal law from
taxes levied by Virginia Code sections 58.1-400 and 58.1-.
400.1.'2 An FSC is an export subsidy program under federal
law that allows an exporter to establish an FSC in a foreign
country, and either split export profits with the FSC or pay the
FSC a commission on exports.' 3 The profits or commissions
paid to the FSC do not have to reflect the amount actually
earned by the FSC under arm's length pricing rules normally
applicable to transactions between affiliated corporations. This
legislation would prohibit the Department of Taxation from
reassigning profits or commissions paid to an FSC back to the
corporation that actually earned the income.
3. Contracts with Commercial Printers
The 1995 legislature amended section 58.1-401 to ensure that
an out-of-state corporation will not be subjected to Virginia's
income tax solely. because it contracts with a Virginia commer-
cial printer for printing.' 4 Provided that the corporation is
not otherwise subject to corporate income tax, certain activities
at the Virginia commercial printer's location, by or on behalf of
the corporation, will not subject the corporation to Virginia
income tax. The activities specified in the legislation are:
(i) the ownership or leasing of tangible personal property
located at the printer's premises which is used solely in
connection with the printing contract; (ii) the sale by the
corporation at another location of any property that is
printed at and shipped or distributed from the printer's
premises; (iii) any activities in connection with the printing
contract performed by or on behalf of that corporation at
the printer's premises; and (iv) any activities in connection
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-401(8) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
173. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 923, 927 (1994).
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-401(7) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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with the printing contract performed by the printer for or
on behalf of the corporation."5
This new exemption from Virginia income tax is limited to
property such as printing plates, copyrights, and printed mate-
rials, and activities like quality control monitoring that are
directly related to the printing contract. Sales activity by the
corporation at the commercial printer is not exempt because it
may closely resemble a sales office.
C. Department of Taxation Modifies Rules on Corporate Income
Tax Factor Attribution from Limited Partnerships
The Virginia Department of Taxation (the "Department")
modified its position on corporate income tax factor attribution
from limited partnerships in Public Document 95-19.16
The Virginia income tax rules applicable to a limited partner-
ship with corporate, partnership or individual partners raises
several Virginia income tax requirements. The rules vary de-
pending on the type of partner (entity or individual) in the
partnership. Public Document 88-165"7 provides a baseline
interpretation of Virginia's income tax rules for partnerships, S
corporations, C corporations and individuals. However, it has
been modified by a number of rulings since. 8
1. Prior Interpretations Involving Factor Attribution From
Partnerships
The Department of Taxation ruled in Public Document 88-
165179 that
175. Id.
176. VIRGINIA DEP'T TAXATION, PuB. Doc. 95-19 (February 13, 1995) [hereinafter
PUB. Doc. 95-19].
177. VIRGINIA DEP'T TAXATION, PUB. Doc. 88-165 (June 29, 1988) [hereinafter PUB.
Doc. 88-165].
178. See PuB. Doc. 95-19; VIRGINIA DEP'T TAXATION, PUB. DOC. 94-240 (Aug. 5,
1994) [hereinafter PUB. Doc. 94-240]; VIRGINIA DEP'T TAXATION, PUB. Doc. 92-60
(May 1, 1992) [hereinafter PUB. Doc. 92-60]; VIRGINIA DEP'T TAXATION, PUB. Doc. 88-
235 (Aug. 10, 1988) [hereinafter PUB. DOC. 88-235]; VIRGINIA DEP'T TAXATION, PUB.
Doc. 88-226 (July 29, 1988) [hereinafter PUB. DOc. 88-226].
179. PUB. Doc. 88-165.
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[ilf a partnership or S corporation is carrying on business,
trade, profession or occupation in Virginia or is receiving
income as a partner in a partnership which is carrying on a
business, trade, profession or occupation in Virginia, the
pass-through of Virginia source income will continue until
the income is passed through to a partner that is a taxable
entity (an individual or C corporation).'
The Department modified Public Document 88-165 with its
ruling in Public Document 88-226.1"1 The Department ruled
that a corporation holding a general partnership interest in a
partnership must include its proportionate share of partnership
property, payroll and sales in its own corporate factors for
purposes of apportioning Virginia taxable income.182 The same
result does not apply when the corporation has only a limited
partner interest in a partnership. In Public Document 88-
235,1" the Department further modified Public Document 88-
165 and ruled that a corporate limited partner was not required
to include its share of partnership property, payroll and sales
for purposes of determining its Virginia apportionment
factor.
18
In Public Document 92-60," the Department modified its
position in Public Document 88-235 when it ruled that a corpo-
ration that was both a general and a limited partner in the
same partnership must include its proportionate share (general
and limited) of partnership property, payroll and sales in its
own factors when apportioning Virginia taxable income.186
Approximately two years later, the Department again modi-
fied its earlier position in Public Document 88-235 with respect
to factor attribution from a limited partnership. In Public Docu-
ment 94-240,1"7 the Department ruled that factor attribution
attributable to a limited partnership interest held by an S cor-
180. Id. at 6.
181. PuB. Doc. 88-226.
182. Id. at 2.
183. PUB. Doc. 88-235.
184. Id. at 2.
185. PuB. Doc. 92-60.
186. Id. at 3.
187. PuB. Doc. 94-240.
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poration is required in order to properly reflect the Virginia
taxable income of non-resident S corporation shareholders."
2. Newest Modification of Factor Attribution Rules From
Partnerships
In Public Document 95-19,"' the Department again found it
necessary to modify its position in Public Document 88-235,
although the facts in Public Document 95-19 are quite different
from the earlier rulings. In Public Document 95-19, a Virginia
limited partnership had two partners that were foreign corpora-
tions. Company A was the ninety-nine percent limited partner
and Company B, a related party, held a one percent general
partnership interest.9 ' The usual scenario involving a two-
partner partnership would involve an unrelated third party as
the general partner.
Typically these limited partnership interests were structured
as "tax shelters" or "master limited partnerships." In either
scenario, the Department usually found that because the
partnership interests were passive investments representing a
small overall percentage ownership interest in the partnership,
factor attribution would not be required." Under the facts
described in Public Document 95-19, however, the general part-
ner was a related party, the partnership was an active operat-
ing company (not a passive investment), and the affiliated
group held 100% of the partnership interest."9
The Department stated that if it did not require factor attri-
bution from the limited partnership, Company A would be able
to avoid Virginia taxation on 99% of the Virginia business ac-
tivity carried on by the limited partnership."9 To avoid this
result, the Department relied on the principles contained in
Virginia Code sections 58.1-445 and 58.1-446 to adjust the tax-
188. Id. at 3.
189. PuB. Doc. 95-19.
190. Id. at 1.
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 3.
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able income of the two companies.' Section 58.1-445 pro-
vides:
In any case of two or more related trades or businesses
liable to taxation under this chapter owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Department
may, and at the request of the taxpayer shall, if necessary
in order to make an accurate distribution or apportionment
of gains, profits, income, deductions, or capital between or
among such related trades or businesses, consolidate the
accounts of such related trades or businesses."5
Section 58.1-446 provides that the Department may require a
consolidated report by related corporations if Virginia income is
not equitably reported."
In holding that "[Company] A was required to include its
proportionate share of the [limited partnership]'s property, pay-
roll and sales with its own property, payroll and sales data for
purposes of determining its Virginia apportionment factor," the
Tax Commissioner said the result would "be the same regard-
less of whether [Company] A had any other business activity in
addition to holding the limited partnership interest.""' The
Department indicated that if requiring Company A to include
its share of the limited partnership's factors improperly reflect-
ed Virginia taxable income from business done in Virginia, the
Department would seek other remedies, including consolidating
Company A with the limited partnership or consolidating Com-
pany A with Company B."
Although the Department of Taxation officially modified Pub-
lic Document 88-235 with its ruling in Public Document 95-19,
it said it will continue to follow Public Document 88-235 in
situations where:
i) a corporation holds a limited partnership interest; ii) all
general partners are unrelated third parties; iii) the com-
bined partnership interests held by the corporation and all
194. Id. at 2-3.
195. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-445 (RepL Vol. 1991)).
196. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-446 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
197. PUB. DOC. 95-19 at 3.
198. Id.
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related parties constitute 10% or less of the profit and capi-
tal interests of the limited partnership; and iv) the stiuc-
ture is not a device primarily designed to avoid. Virginia
taxation of the limited partnership's income."'
The Commissioner stated that the Department will continue to
examine other situations on a case-by-case basis °0
II. RETAIL SALES AND USE TAXES
A. Recent Judicial Decisions
In Carr v. Forst,2"' the Supreme Court of Virginia unani-
mously held that the Tax Commissioner's imposition of a "pur-
pose of the publication" requirement amounts to a misinterpre-
tation of the tax exemption language contained in the Virginia
Retail Sales and Use Tax Act 02 under former section 58.1-
608(A)(6)(c) of the Virginia Code." 3 The taxpayers in Carr
compiled and distributed magazines to the general public in
which real estate brokerage firms advertised residential proper-
ty for sale. The magazines were published every four weeks and
were distributed by the taxpayers free of charge to the cities
shown on the covers of the magazines. In a declaratory judg-
ment proceeding, the taxpayers sought a determination that
they were exempt from the Virginia Retail Sales and Use Tax
Act under former section 58.1-608(A)(6)(c). The Department of
Taxation argued that the statutory exemption was not available
to the Carrs' publication because the purpose of the publication
was intended to promote the sale of goods and/or services.2
The Department took the position that if a publication was
intended to communicate ideas and information, such a pub-
lication would be entitled to the exemption.0" However, the
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 249 Va. 66, 453 S.E.2d 274 (1995).
202. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-608(A)(6)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992). This
exemption from Virginia sales and use tax was recodified at Virginia Code § 58.1-
609.6(3) by the 1993 General Assembly and amended in 1995. VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-
609.6(3) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
203. Carr, 249 Va. at 70-71, 453 S.E.2d at 276.
204. Id. at 70, 453 S.E.2d at 276.
205. Id.
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Department of Taxation argued that the exemption should not
apply to magazines whose purpose was to advertise the sale of
real estate rather than communicate information. 6
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the statute exempts
"any publication" without any exception or qualification." '
Specifically, the supreme court stated that "the Commissioner
reads into the statute an element (i.e., the purpose of the publi-
cation) that is contrary to the statute's plain meaning."2 M The
supreme court reversed the trial court's judgment and entered a
final judgment for the taxpayers declaring that the costs of the
printing of the magazines were exempt from the retail sales
and use tax.09
Taxpayers also successfully recovered against the Department
of Taxation in Old Dominion Camera Shop, Inc. v. Department
of Taxation.2' The taxpayer was a "camera shop" which sold
cameras, lenses, camera bags, film, development equipment,
and picture frames, and also developed film and made copies
and enlargements of photographs. The Department of Taxation
levied taxes on the supplies and equipment used in Old Domin-
ion Camera Shop's photo-finishing process. These supplies con-
sisted of chemicals, developer, fixer, bleach, and the paper used
in the process. The equipment involved was a "mini lab" and a
"silver recovery" unit.21' The mini lab had two components: a
film processor and a paper processor.
Undeveloped film from a customer's camera was placed in the
film processor to create negatives. The negatives were then
placed in the paper processor to create photographs. The silver
recovery unit was used to collect the residue of the chemicals
used during the developing process."
The trial court held that the taxes imposed on these chemi-
cals and equipment were improperly assessed and ordered those
206. Id.
207. Id. at 71, 453 S.E.2d at 276.
208. Id.
209. Id., 453 S.E.2d at 277.
210. 38 Va. Cir. 374 (Richmond City 1996).
211. Id. at 374.
212. Id. at 374-75.
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taxes to be refunded.213 In reaching this decision, the Rich-
mond Circuit Court found the photo-finishing business of the
Old Dominion Camera Shop to be an industrial operation which
qualified for an exemption from sales and use taxes under sec-
tion 58.1-609.3(2).214 The Tax Department argued that the
photo-finishing business was similar to the processing opera-
tions conducted by the taxpayers in Golden Skillet Corp. v.
Commonwealth25 and Commonwealth v. Orange-Madison Co-
operative,16 however, the circuit court did not agree.1 7
B. Significant Recent Legislative Activity
The 1995 General Assembly adopted legislation that exempts
from the Virginia use tax purchases from out-of-state mail or-
der companies totalling $100 or less during any calendar
year.1 8 Prior to this legislation, the Department of Taxation
did not require individuals to file use tax returns if their total
purchases, upon which no Virginia sales tax was paid, were
twenty-five dollars or less. The 1995 legislation increases the
threshold filing amount by seventy-five dollars and extends the
filing threshold to businesses. 21 Virginia residents who make
purchases from out-of-state mail order companies totalling more
than $100 during any calendar year must pay use tax on the
total purchase amount, with no exemption for the first $100 in
purchases. °
The 1995 legislature also adopted an exemption for third
party gift transactions in which a nonresident, by mail or tele-
phone purchase order, directs a Virginia business to deliver the
personal property as a gift to another nonresident." Gifts de-
livered to Virginia residents at the direction of out-of-state pur-
213. Id. at 378.
214. Id.
215. 214 Va. 276, 199 S.E.2d 511 (1973).
216. 220 Va. 655, 261 S.E.2d 532 (1980).
217. Old Dominion Camera, 38 Va. Cir. at 376-77.
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-604(5) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-604(5) (Cure. Supp. 1995).
220. Id.
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-602 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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chasers and gifts purchased by Virginia residents for delivery to
out-of-state recipients remain taxable. 2
A new exemption for sales of printed materials to a Virginia
advertising agency of printed materials for distribution out-of-
state was also adopted by the 1995 General Assembly.2" This
legislation also exempts newspaper supplements for placement
in in-state and out-of-state publications.' Prior to this
change, printing for use out-of-state, as well as newspaper ad-
vertising supplements, were normally exempt from the tax, but
were taxable to advertising agencies under a specific provision
of law.2
Another significant piece of legislation enacted by the 1995
legislature modifies the nexus requirements for certain limited
transactions involving Virginia commercial printers."26 The
statute ensures that an out-of-state person who contracts with a
commercial printer in Virginia will not be subject to sales tax
or registration and collection requirements solely because of
their contractual relationship with the printer.22 ' The legisla-
tion specifies four activities by such a person that are not to be
considered in determining whether a person is required to reg-
ister as a dealer for sales tax purposes. These activities include:
(1) owning or leasing property at the printer's premises which
is used solely in connection with the printing contract with that
person; (2) the sale of property printed at and shipped or
distributed from the printer's premises;' (3) activities in con-
nection with the printing contract with the person performed by
or on behalf of that person at the printer's premises;" and
(4) activities in connection with the printing contract with the
person performed by the printer elsewhere in Virginia for or on
behalf of that person." 1 Note, however, if that person con-
ducts other activities on its own accord-for example, operating
222. See id.
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.6(4) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
224. Id.
225. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-602, -609.6(4) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
226. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612(D) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
227. Id.
228. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
229. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612(D)(2) (Cum- Supp. 1996).
230. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612(D)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
231. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612(D)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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a warehouse or office, sending sales representatives into the
state to solicit sales, or advertising in newspapers or other
periodicals printed and published within Virginia-this legisla-
tion will have no bearing on its tax registration and collection
requirements.
The 1996 Session of the General Assembly took a consider-
ably more stringent view of bills creating additional exemptions
or exclusions from Virginia's sales and use taxes. One success-
ful legislative effort involved the prescription medicine and drug
exemption.232 This legislation addressed the appropriate tax
treatment applicable to research pharmaceutical manufacturers
who provide free samples of prescription drugs and medicines to
Virginia licensed physicians. Generally, the research pharma-
ceutical manufacturing industry considered the distribution of
prescription drug and medicine samples to Virginia licensed
physicians at no cost to be exempt from Virginia use tax.
Research pharmaceutical manufacturers use representatives
or "detailmen" who live both in and outside of Virginia. The
"detailmen" describe the company's prescription pharmaceutical
products and provide prescription pharmaceutical drug samples
to Virginia physicians. In connection with this activity, these
representatives take prescription pharmaceutical drug samples
with them. The prescription pharmaceutical samples are medici-
nally identical to the products obtained from a pharmacist. The
primary differences between the prescription products sold by a
pharmacist and the samples dispensed at no cost by Virginia
physicians are the packaging size and labeling of the samples.
Samples are packaged in smaller quantities than those sold by
pharmacists and the packaging is clearly labeled as a
"professional sample." The detailmen call upon Virginia licensed
physicians to inform the physicians of new products or develop-
ments and to distribute samples of prescription pharmaceu-
ticals. Under federal law, only prescription pharmaceutical
samples requested and signed for by the physician may be left
at the doctor's offices.'
Virginia physicians use these prescription pharmaceutical
samples in conjunction with prescribing the particular pharma-
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
233. See Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, 21 U.S.C. § 353(d)(2) (1994).
1576
TAXATION
ceutical product to a patient. The prescription pharmaceutical
samples are generally passed along by physicians to patients in
three situations. First, understanding that prescription
pharmaceuticals are generally very expensive, physicians give
samples to patients for an initial "trial period." Providing a
short-term supply of a drug in the form of a sample allows the
physician to evaluate whether or not a patient can tolerate a
drug and whether it interacts properly with that patient before
the patient spends a potentially large sum of money filling the
prescription for a longer term. If the drug works and no undue
side effects are noted, the patient will then purchase the pre-
scription medicine from a pharmacist and continue to take it.
If, however, the sample medication does not work, or causes
unacceptable side effects, a prescription for an alternative phar-
maceutical product will be provided and the patient saves the
high cost of a prescription that he or she is unable to tolerate.
Second, the prescription pharmaceutical sample is a starter
kit for the patient so that the patient begins taking the drug
promptly. Third, prescription pharmaceutical samples are
provided by physicians to patients who cannot afford to pur-
chase the drug in the quantity necessary to treat their medical
condition.
Virginia Code section 58.1-609.7(1) provides an exemption
from Virginia sales and use taxes for medicines and drugs that
are dispensed by or sold according to prescriptions or work
orders of licensed physicians.2" Nowhere in the Virginia Re-
tail Sales and Use Tax Act are there definitions for the terms
"dispensed by," "prescriptions," or "work orders." However, the
Virginia Drug Control Act' provides the relevant definitions.
The term "dispense" means "to deliver a drug to an ultimate
user or research subject buyer pursuant to the lawful order of a
practitioner, including the prescribing and administering, pack-
aging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the sub-
stance for that delivery.""5
In 1994, the Department of Taxation released three adminis-
trative rulings that specifically addressed the application of
234. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
235. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3400 to -3472 (Repl. VoL 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
236. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3401 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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Virginia's use tax to the prescription drug exemption in the
context of prescription pharmaceutical samples." The import
of the 1994 rulings is that a pharmaceutical manufacturer real-
izes a marketing or advertising "taxable use" benefit by provid-
ing Virginia physicians with samples." 8 In reaching this re-
sult, the Department held that the pharmaceutical
manufacturer's first taxable use occurs when the prescription
drug or medicine sample is withdrawn from the manufacturer's
inventory with the intent to distribute the samples to licensed
physicians." 9
The 1996 General Assembly amended section 58.1-609.7(1) to
specifically overrule the three Department of Taxation rulings
which applied the use tax to the distribution of prescription
pharmaceutical drugs and sample medicines to Virginia licensed
physicians."
Another important piece of legislation enacted by the 1996
General Assembly involves an exclusion from sales and use
taxes for certain ships, vessels, and dredges, and repairs and
alterations to these watercraft."4 Virginia Code section 58.1-
609.3(4) of the specifically provides an exemption for: (1) ships
or vessels used exclusively or principally in interstate or foreign
237. ViRGINA DEP'T TAXATION, PUB. DoC. 94-78 (March 21, 1994); VIRGINIA DEP'T
TAXATION, PUB. DOc. 94-97 (March 31, 1994); VIRGINIA DEP'T TAXATION, PUB. Doc.
94-122 (April 20, 1994).
238. See documents cited supra note 238.
239. Id.
240. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996). In a dialogue between
members of the House Finance Committee and representatives of the Department, the
Committee specifically stated that all prescription pharmaceutical products are not to
be taxed. Hearings on H.B. 224 Before the House Finance Comm., Va. Gen. Assembly,
(Reg. Sess. 1996) (unpublished). In particular, Delegate Rhodes argued vociferously
that the Department of Taxation should not tax any prescription pharmaceutical
drugs and medicines. Hearings on H.B. 224 Before the House Finance Comm., Va.
Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (statement of Delegate Rhodes) (unpublished). From
hearings before both the House Finance Committee and the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, it was clearly evident that Virginia legislators do not want any tax imposed on
prescription pharmaceutical products. Hearings on H.B. 224 Before the House Finance
Committee and the Senate Finance Comm., Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)
(unpublished). In other words, the Virginia General Assembly's legislative intent be-
hind the prescription pharmaceutical drug and medicine exemption is that "as a class
these prescription drug products are exempt from Virginia sales and use taxes."
Hearings on H.B. 224 Before the House Finance Comm., Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg.
Sess. 1996) (statement of Delegate Rhodes) (unpublished)
241. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.3(4) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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commerce and repairs and alterations to such vehicles; (2) fuel
and supplies for use or consumption on vessels plying the high
seas; and (3) materials used in the building, conversion or re-
pair of any of the vessels in either (1) or (2).'
This legislation codifies the Department of Taxation's policy
of exempting dredges and attendant vessels used directly in the
dredging of interstate waterways, and expands the exemption
for ships and vessels to include supporting equipment and other
attendant vessels used or to be used in dredging operations
exclusively or principally in interstate commerce. The newly
expanded exemption will apply to vessels used to transport
employees or equipment to and from the dredge site. Vessels
used to survey and mark the dredge area, repair parts for such
vehicles, buoys, fuel used to power equipment aboard the
dredge and other vessels, ropes, chains, and other tangible
personal property used in dredging operations exclusively or
principally in interstate commerce are also exempt.'
On a procedural note, another important piece of legislation
in the sales and use tax area establishes new requirements for
the introduction of exemptions or exclusions from sales and use
tax. The 1996 General Assembly adopted legislation, effective
beginning July 1, 1998, that requires sales and use tax exemp-
tion bills to be introduced in the General Assembly only in
regular sessions of even-numbered years. 4 The legislation
will not apply to any bill extending the expiration date or de-
laying the effective date of any sales and use tax exemp-
tions.'
III. TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS ENACTED
The 1996 General Assembly enacted a Virginia Taxpayer Bill
of Rights which will take effect on July 1, 1997.' This legis-
lation is intended to protect the "rights, privacy, and property
of Virginia taxpayers" with respect to taxes administrated by
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-19.05(A), -19.1:3 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
245. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-19.1:3 (Repl. VoL 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
246. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1845 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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the Department of Taxation."7 Generally, the legislation sum-
marizes the rights and obligations of taxpayers and the Depart-
ment of Taxation during the initial tax assessment through the
collection and enforcement processes.' The legislation
package also amends a number of statutes governing the pow-
ers and authorities granted to the Tax Commissioner for en-
forcement and administration of the State Tax Code and codi-
fies specific rights for taxpayers. 9 Generally, the legislative
package performs the following functions: (1) allows taxpayers
fourteen days in which to contest jeopardy assessments and
requires a response by the Department of Taxation within
twenty days of a meeting;25 (2) creates a statutory framework
for allowing installment payment plans for outstanding tax
liabilities;251 (3) creates a taxpayer resolution program and
provides for a taxpayer rights advocate and adequate staff to
administer the program;1 2 (4) requires the Department of
Taxation to provide a written explanation of the audit and
collection process; allows a taxpayer to be represented at meet-
ings and to suspend meetings to consult with the representa-
tive; and allows taxpayers and the Department to make audio
recordings of meetings;2' and (5) creates the right of
abatement of penalty, interest or tax attributable to erroneous
advice from the Department of Taxation.2
Contained within the main body of the Virginia Taxpayer Bill
of Rights statutory scheme is a list of sixteen rights specifically
guaranteed to Virginia taxpayers. Effective July 1, 1997, Virgin-
ia taxpayers will specifically enjoy the following rights:
1. The right to available information and prompt, courte-
ous, accurate responses to questions and requests for tax
assistance.
2. The right to request assistance from a taxpayers'
rights advocate, . . . [an employee within the Department
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-202, -307, -313, -1805, -1817, -1818, -1834, -1835,
-1845 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
250. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-313(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
251. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1817 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
252. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1818 (Cur. Supp. 1996).
253. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1834 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
254. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-1835, -1845(4) (Cun Supp. 1996).
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of Taxation] responsible for facilitating the resolution of tax-
payer complaints and problems not resolved through normal
administrative channels within the Department.
3. The right to be represented or advised by counsel or
other qualified representative .. in... administrative
interactions with the Department [of Taxation]; the right to
procedural safeguards with respect to recording of meetings
during tax determination or collection processes conducted
by the Department [of Taxation];... and [t]he right to
have audits, inspections of records, and meetings conducted
at a reasonable time and place except in criminal or inter-
nal investigations ....
4. The right to abatement of tax, interest, and penal-
ties... when the taxpayer reasonably relies upon binding
written advice furnished [by an authorized departmental
representative] in response to the taxpayer's specific written
request which provided adequate and accurate information.
5. The right to obtain simple, nontechnical statements
which explain the procedures, remedies, and rights avail-
able during audit, appeals, and collection proceedings...
and the right to be provided with an explanation for details
of refunds as well as the basis of the audit, assessments, or
denials of refunds which identify any amount of tax, inter-
est or penalty due and which explain the consequences of
the taxpayer's failure to comply with the notice ....
6. The right to be informed of impending collection ac-
tions which require sale or seizure of property or freezing of
assets, except jeopardy assessments, and the right to at
least fourteen days' notice in which to pay the liability or
seek further review.
7. [T]he right to have an immediate review of [a] jeopar-
dy assessment ....
8. The right to seek review, through formal or informal
proceedings, of any adverse decisions relating to determina-
tions in the audit or collections processes.
9. The right to have the taxpayer's tax information kept
confidential, unless otherwise specified by law ....
10. The right to procedures for retirement of tax obliga-
tions by installment payment agreements ....
11. The right to procedures.., for requesting for re-
lease of liens filed by the Department [of Taxation] and for
requesting that any lein which is filed in error be so noted
on the lien cancellation fied by the Department ....
12. The right to procedures which assure that the indi-
vidual employees of the Department [of Taxation] are not
paid, evaluated, or promoted on the basis of the amount of
assessments or collections from taxpayers ....
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13. The right to have the Department [of Taxation] begin
and complete its audits in a timely and expeditious manner
after notification of intent to audit25
PART TWO: TAXES ADMINISTERED BY LOCALITIES
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF INTANGIBLE AND TANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY
A. Recent Judicial Decision: City of Winchester v. American
Woodmark Corp."5
In a widely anticipated decision, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia unanimously held in City of Winchester v. American
Woodmark Corp. 7 that a manufacturer's furniture, fixtures,
office equipment and computer equipment located in its corpo-
rate headquarters are "used in" its manufacturing business,
even though no products are specifically manufactured within
the taxing jurisdiction.25 This case required the supreme
court to interpret the interplay between Virginia's intangible
personal property and tangible personal property statutory tax
schemes.
1. Virginia's Intangible Personal Property Tax
Virginia Code section 58.1-1100 segregates intangible person-
al property and the capital of a trade or business (except
merchants' capital as defined in Virginia Code section 58.1-
3510) for state taxation only, not for local taxation. 9 Section
58.1-1101(A)(2) defines intangible personal property as capital
that is personal property, tangible in fact, and used in a manu-
facturing business.260
255. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1845 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
256. 250 Va. 451, 464 S.E.2d 148 (1995).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 457, 464 S.E.2d at 152.
259. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1100 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
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By virtue of the intangible personal property tax classifica-
tion statutes, a taxpayer could easily owe tax on a number of
tangible personal property items used in a manufacturing
business which are now treated as if they were intangible per-
sonal property assets. With this classification, only the Com-
monwealth of Virginia can impose a tax on the property, even
though such property is physically "touchable or grabable" as
tangible in fact property.26' Currently, Virginia does not im-
pose an intangible personal property tax.262 By virtue of this
lack of taxation on intangible personal property, taxpayers fre-
quently take the position that if they are a manufacturer then
all of their tangible in fact personal property items are intangi-
ble property, and thus not subject to taxation by the local tax-
ing jurisdiction.
This awkward conclusion was approved by the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Roanoke v. James W. Michael's Bakery
Corp.2" The taxpayer, Michael's Bakery, was engaged in the
bakery business in the City of Roanoke and owned a number of
delivery trucks. The case is unique because the Commonwealth
of Virginia and the City of Roanoke were at odds as to which
entity was the appropriate taxing authority. Roanoke main-
tained that under section 171 of the 1902 Constitution2  (pre-
decessor to Article X, Section 4 of the 1971 Virginia Constitu-
tion),265 the Commonwealth lacked jurisdiction to tax tangible
personal property. The City maintained that such property was
segregated for local taxation only. Roanoke also argued that
under section 168 of the 1902 Constitution266 (predecessor to
Article X, Section 1),267 the General Assembly's power to de-
fine and classify taxable property is subject to such segrega-
tion.2' The Commonwealth argued that the last sentence of
section 168 of the 1902 Constitution provided the Geheral As-
sembly with a broad power to define and classify taxable sub-
261. Id.
262. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(aX5).
263. 180 Va. 132, 21 S.E.2d 788 (1942).
264. VA. CONST. § 171 (1902).
265. VA. CoNsT. art. Y, § 4.
266. VA. CONST. § 168 (1902).
267. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
268. Michael's Bakery, 180 Va. at 138-41, 21 S.E.2d at 791-92.
1996] 1583
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1543
jects, including classifying intangible personal property as tangi-
ble personal property."9
The Roanoke Circuit Court concluded that the Common-
wealth of Virginia was the appropriate taxing authorityY ° In
upholding the trial court, the Supreme Court of Virginia looked
at the long standing practice of classifying capital used in a
business as intangible personal property. The supreme court
noted that at the time the Constitution of 1902 became effec-
tive, the General Assembly met in an extra session to adjust
the statutory law to the changes made in the new 1902
Constitution.27' The General Assembly continued to classify
and define capital, as a composite whole, as intangible personal
property, although it includes items which were tangible in
fact. 2 The supreme court noted a continuation of the practice
of treating tangible in fact property as intangible personal prop-
erty when such property was used as capital in a business."'
The supreme court stated that when the General Assembly
segregated "tangible personal property" for local taxation, it did
not intend to include in that term capital employed in business,
for this was expressly classified as "intangible personal proper-
ty" and was segregated for taxation by the State although the
definition of capital included some items of personal property
which were tangible in fact. 4 The supreme court stated that
when the statutes were revised in 1928, the General Assembly
and the Commission for the Revision, Simplification and Codifi-
cation of the general tax laws of Virginia were cognizant of the
constitutional segregation in existence at that time."'
The Virginia Tax Commissioner testified that since assuming
office in 1926, he had uniformly enforced the statute requiring
that inventory or stock on hand, furniture and fixtures and
delivery equipment of mining and manufacturing concerns be
reported as capital to the State for taxation purposes." 6 The
269. Id. at 141-42, 21 S.E.2d at 792.
270. Id. at 137, 21 S.E.2d at 789.
271. Id. at 144, 21 S.E.2d at 793.
272. Id. at 145, 21 S.E.2d at 793.
273. Id. at 146, 21 S.E.2d at 794.
274. Id. at 149, 21 S.E.2d at 795.
275. Id. at 149-50, 21 S.E.2d at 796.
276. Id. at 151, 21 S.E.2d at 796.
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Tax Commissioner also testified that local tax officials had
acquiesced in this practice. " His testimony indicated that
this practice was so deeply rooted in the Virginia scheme of
taxation that adopting the argument of the City of Roanoke
would result in a heavy loss of revenue to Virginia, with a
corresponding gain to localities.7 8
The supreme court concluded that section 171 of the 1902
Constitution made no specific allocation of intangible personal
property, including capital, to the State for taxation." The
supreme court noted that segregation was merely the result of
the statute.28 The supreme court opined that "if the General
Assembly, as a matter of policy, deems it proper to exclude
from its definition of capital certain property of a few business-
es ... which the State [may] otherwise tax, and sees fit to
segregate such property to the locality] for taxation, there is
nothing in the [Virginia] Constitution to prohibit [the General
Assembly] from doing so." "1
Commentators have criticized Michael's Bakery and believe
that Judge Eggleston was understandably hard pressed to reach
the conclusion which the General Assembly doubtlessly intend-
ed. One author called for the end of the fiction that permits a
State statute to provide that property which is tangible in fact
must be considered intangible in order to circumvent the clear
mandate of the Virginia Constitution. 2 In a strongly worded
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 154, 21 S.E.2d at 798.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See Alan J. Hofheimer, Taxation of Personal Property in Virginia: A Plea for
Clarification, 44 VA. L. REV. 127, 133 (1958). Hofiheiner added that:
[i]t would seem that the General Assembly does not have the inherent
power in classifying subjects for taxation to disregard the segregation
provision of the State Constitution. It, therefore, has not the authority to
accomplish its purpose by calling black white, by calling a truck an in-
tangible asset, or by any other method of indirection. The argument ad-
vanced by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals from time to time, that
this has been going on for many years, is unimpressive. If the Tax De-
partment of the State of Virginia cannot find sufficient taxable subjects
under the State Constitution to meets its revenue requirements, and it is
unable to obtain a constitutional amendment which will increase its tax-
able subjects, then it should endeavor to have the rate of tax raised on
subjects available to it. The State should not tax property which the
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dissent to Michael's Bakery, Justice Holt closed his opinion by
stating that "one must travel far to prove that a truck is not a
truck."
283
The supreme court's decision in Michael's Bakery precludes a
realistic opportunity to directly challenge the constitutionality of
Virginia's intangible personal property tax scheme. Subsequent
challenges by local tax authorities have taken the form of
narrowly interpreting the definition of intangible personal prop-
erty in an attempt to "carve out" items of tangible in fact busi-
ness property. The City of Winchester recently attempted just
such an opportunity in City of Winchester v. American
Woodmark Corp."s
2. American Woodmark Corporation Seeks Refund
American Woodmark Corporation ("American Woodmark") is
a publicly traded Virginia corporation with its corporate head-
quarters located in the City of Winchester, Virginia. American
Woodmark was engaged in the manufacture and sale of wooden
kitchen cabinets and vanities. Component parts were manufac-
tured at four locations, all of which were outside the geograph-
ical boundaries of the City of Winchester. In addition, American
Woodmark had a number of assembly plants, distribution cen-
ters, sales and service centers, and manufacturing facilities
located outside Virginia. American Woodmark did have an as-
sembly facility and a component manufacturing plant located
within Virginia, but outside the City of Winchester.'
The functions performed at the corporate headquarters in-
cluded establishing and monitoring overall corporate direction
and strategy, overall management of American Woodmark's
business, consolidated reporting of its financial information,
approving extensions of credit to prospective customers, selling
and marketing of cabinets and vanities produced by other
American Woodmark facilities, invoicing sales, collecting ac-
State Constitution declares only can be taxed by cities or counties ....
This is not good judicial reasoning.
Id.
283. Michael's Bakery, 180 Va. at 158, 21 S.E.2d at 800 (Holt, J., dissenting).
284. 250 Va. 451, 464 S.E.2d 148 (1995).
285. Id. at 454-55, 464 S.E.2d at 150-51.
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counts receivable, paying purchase invoices, maintaining a com-
pany-wide computer network, and fulfilling the accounting, tax
and regulatory compliance functions required to manage and
operate the company's business activities. American Woodmark
did not engage in the actual production of cabinets and vanities
at its corporate headquarters in the City of Winchester, nor any
other location within the geographical boundaries of the City of
Winchester.
For the tax years 1989-1992, American Woodmark filed the
appropriate business schedules for the City of Winchester with
Commissioner of the Revenue Lacky G. Sempeles.286 These
business schedules reported personal property of American
Woodmark located within the City of Winchester. On the basis
of the information supplied on each business schedule, Commis-
sioner Sempeles billed American Woodmark for personal proper-
ty taxes for each of the years at issue on all of the items of
property listed on the business schedules by American
Woodmark."7 American Woodmark then paid to the City of
Winchester the personal property taxes assessed against it.'
Subsequently, American Woodmark timely filed a request for
refund with Commissioner Sempels, including amended returns
for each of the years 1989-1992.289 The refund request was
based on American Woodmark's contention that no tangible
personal property tax is properly assessed by the City of
Winchester on any tangible property used by American
Woodmark in its facilities in the City of Winchester, other than
machinery and tools, motor vehicles and delivery equip-
ment." ° The amount of American Woodmark's refund request
totalled $464,637.291 Commissioner Sempeles, acting in his ca-
pacity as Commissioner of Revenue for the City of Winchester,
denied American Woodmark's refund request for the tax years
at issue.
286. American Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester, 34 Va. Cir. 421, 430
(Winchester City 1994).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 430-31.
290. Id. at 431.
291. Id.
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The primary issue in American Woodmark was whether the
taxpayer's computers, office fixtures and office equipment locat-
ed in its corporate headquarters constituted capital that was
personal property, tangible in fact, used in a manufacturing
business and more properly classified as intangible personal
property under Virginia Code section 58.1-1101(A)(2). The City
of Winchester contended that since American Woodmark did not
perform any actual manufacturing within the City, then the
tangible personal property in question could not be "personal
property, tangible in fact, [and] used in a manufacturing" busi-
ness.292 American Woodmark argued that as a manufacturer
of wood cabinets and vanities, all of its tangible in fact personal
property should be classified as intangible personal property
under section 58.1-1101(A)(2) unless such property is otherwise
classified as machinery and tools, motor vehicles and delivery
equipment."3  These latter classifications of property are
carved out of the intangible personal property definition and
segregated for local taxation as tangible personal property.
3. Trial Court Orders Tax Refund
Winchester Circuit Court Judge Wetsel, in an extensive twen-
ty-five page opinion, held that American Woodmark was enti-
tled to a full refund of the personal property taxes paid that
were allocable to the computer equipment, office fixtures, and
office furniture located within the City of Winchester.294 Judge
Wetsel's opinion provides a valuable review of the intangible
personal property tax scheme as it relates to tangible business
property and machinery and tools. In his decision, Judge Wetsel
stated that the propositions relied on by the City of
Winchester-that tax exemptions are to be construed strictly
against the taxpayer and that the taxpayer has the burden of
establishing entitlement of an exemption-were not applica-
ble."5 Specifically, Judge Wetsel stated:
292. City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 250 Va. 451, 455, 464
S.E.2d 148, 151 (1995).
293. Id. at 455-56, 464 S.E.2d at 151.
294. American Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester, 34 Va. Cir. 421, 445-46
(Winchester City 1994).
295. Id. at 433.
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Sections 58.1-1100 and 58.1-1102(A)(2) do not exempt from
tax property which would otherwise be subject to taxation.
Rather, they classify and define what property is to be
segregated for taxation solely by the Commonwealth. There-
fore, this is not about an exemption but rather a limitation
on the City's authority to tax and the standards of strict
construction is applied against the City and not the tax-
payer.296
The trial court relied on the longstanding and established
rule that statutes imposing taxes are to be construed most
strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizens.
The circuit court stated, "[w]henever there is doubt concerning
such a statute, that doubt should absolve the taxpayer from his
burden.297 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Wetsel stated
that the court should be cognizant of the policy in Virginia of
promoting manufacturing, and should therefore construe its
definition broadly."
The City of Winchester claimed that American Woodmark's
business in the City was not part of a manufacturing business,
but rather American Woodmark was engaged in four different
businesses-manufacturing, assembling, distribution, and
sales.21 The City cited specific authorities which stand for the
proposition that manufacturing is an activity which transforms
new material into an article or product which is substantially
different in character."0 The Winchester Circuit Court stated
that the term "manufacturing" should be "construed liberally
because 'the public policy of Virginia is to encourage manufac-
turing in the Commonwealth,' and, 'when a party is engaged in
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing activities, it will
nonetheless be classified as a manufacturer for tax purposes if
the manufacturing portion of its business is substantial."''"
296. Id. (citations omitted).
297. Id. at 434 (citing Commonwealth Natural Resources, Inc. v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 529, 537-38, 248 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1978) (holding that franchise tax on gross
receipts and special taxes were improperly assessed on public service corporation
since there was no clear legislative intent to impose franchise tax on gross receipts).
298. Id. (citing County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 238 Va. 64, 69,
380 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1989)).
299. Id.
300. Id. (citing Solite Corp. v. King George County, 220 Va. 661, 663, 261 S.E.2d
535, 536 (1980)).
301. Id. at 434-35 (quoting County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 238
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Judge Wetsel stated that the Commissioner of Revenue should
not subdivide a Virginia business into its component activities
in order to maximize taxes.32 The Winchester Circuit Court
held that American Woodmark was engaged in an integrated
manufacturing business, because it transforms raw materials
into cabinets, and cabinets are articles of "substantially differ-
ent character" from the original raw wood and other materi-
als. 30
3
In specifically addressing the issue of the situs of the actual
physical manufacturing activities, Judge Wetsel stated:
The fact that American Woodmark does not engage in any
production activities at its headquarter facility in the City
of Winchester does not alter American Woodmark's status
as a manufacturing business. The corporate headquarter
facility is clearly part of that manufacturing business. The
functions of the headquarters include overall management
of American Woodmark's manufacturing and business, con-
solidation and reporting of its manufacturing financial infor-
mation, collection of accounts receivable, credit approval,
payment of purchase invoices, filing of all federal, state and
local taxes, and operation and maintenance of the main-
frame computer operations utilized by all American
Woodmark facilities nationwide. These activities are all
integral to any manufacturing business.3 °4
The trial court also ruled that American Woodmark's comput-
er equipment would not be classified as machinery and tools
that are specifically excluded from the definition of intangible
personal property under Virginia Code section 58.1-
1101(A)(2)."3 Judge Wetsel stated that "machinery and tools,"
as used in the statute, refers to items that are used in connec-
tion with the operation of the machinery and that are actually
and directly used in the manufacturing process." 6 Judge
Wetsel concluded that American Woodmark's computers at its
headquarters essentially do the work that clerks would have
Va. 64, 69, 70, 380 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1989)).
302. Id. at 435.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 438-39.
306. Id. at 436.
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done at the time when the tax statutes first began using the
classification of "machinery and tools." 0 7 The circuit court not-
ed that from 1918 to the present, the use of office equipment
had increased geometrically, but the General Assembly had yet
to add the designation of "office equipment" to the class of tan-
gible personal property of a manufacturing business, which may
be taxed only by local government units.0 8
4. Arguments Before the Supreme Court of Virginia
The City of Winchester argued to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia that American Woodmark's personal property located at
the corporate office was subject to local taxation because Ameri-
can Woodmark's headquarters was not a manufacturing busi-
ness under the provisions of Virginia Code section 58.1-
1101(A).3" The City argued that such personal property was
not "used in" a manufacturing business.10 In the alternative,
the City of Winchester argued that if the property is used in a
manufacturing business within the City, such property is part
of the "machinery and tools of' that manufacturing business
and thus taxable locally by the City under the provisions of
section 58.1-1101(A)(2).31' In support of its position, the City
of Winchester argued that the intangible property located in
American Woodmark's corporate headquarters cannot be
deemed capital used in a manufacturing business because
American Woodmark does not manufacture any products within
Winchester's geographical boundaries." The City also argued
that the intangible personal property tax statutes located at
Virginia Code sections 58.1-1100 and 58.1-1101 are tax exemp-
tions and not tax classifications." According to the City, un-
der long standing rules of statutory construction for tax exemp-
307. Id. at 438-39.
308. Id. at 439.
309. City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 250 Va. 451, 455, 464
S.E.2d 148, 151 (1995).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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tions, such exemptions are to be strictly construed against the
taxpayer.314
American Woodmark argued that it was a manufacturing
business within the "plain meaning" of Virginia Code sections
58.1-1100 and 58.1-1101 and that the furniture, fixtures, office
equipment and computer equipment in its corporate headquar-
ters are "used in" its manufacturing business, even though no
products are specifically manufactured in Winchester.1 The
supreme court agreed with American Woodmark's conten-
tion.316
5. Exemption or Classification?
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia spe-
cifically held that Virginia Code sections 58.1-1100 and 58.1-
1101(A)(2) are not tax exemptions, but rather classify certain
personal property, tangible in fact, as intangible personal prop-
erty and segregate that property for state taxation purposes on-
ly. " 7 The supreme court stated that the plain meaning of
these statutes prohibits the City of Winchester from assessing a
personal property tax upon property that falls within the intan-
gible personal property classification.1 8
The critical decision by the supreme court that the intangible
personal property statutes represent a "classification" system as
opposed to tax exemptions, brings into play another statutory
rule of construction. It is a long-standing rule in Virginia that a
municipal corporation, such as the City of Winchester, can only
derive its taxing power through positive grants of authority
from the General Assembly.31 The supreme court stated that
Virginia Code sections 58.1-1100 and 58.1-1101(A)(2) reflect the
General Assembly's decision not to grant a specific taxing power
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. (citing City of Roanoke v. James W. Michael's Bakery Corp., 180 Va. 132,
143-54, 21 S.E.2d 788, 793-98 (1942) (discussing history of segregation and classifica-
tion of personal property for taxation)).
318. Id. at 456, 464 S.E.2d at 152.
319. Id., 464 S.E.2d at 151 (citing Whiting v. Town of West Point, 89 Va. 741, 743
(1893)).
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to the City, and these statutes must be treated as general tax
statutes."'
Viewing the intangible personal property taxation classifica-
tion statutes as general tax statutes, as opposed to tax exemp-
tions, involves a different rule of statutory construction. The
supreme court previously stated that "statutes imposing taxes
are to be construed most strongly against the government, and
in favor of the citizens, and are not to be extended by implica-
tion beyond the clear import of the language used. Whenever
there is a just doubt, 'that doubt should absolve the taxpayer
from his burden.' 32'
In American Woodmark, the supreme court indicated that the
intangible personal property tax statutes are unambiguous.3
The supreme court stated that it found no language in sections
58.1-1100 or 58.1-1101(A)(2) requiring that "capital be used in a
manufacturing facility physically located within the geograph-
ical boundaries of Winchester."3 The supreme court specifi-
cally declined the City of Winchester's request to construe Vir-
ginia Code section 58.1-1101(A)(2) as requiring that a manufac-
turer maintain a manufacturing facility within the City's geo-
graphical boundaries, or that the manufacturer's capital, which
is personal property, tangible in fact, be used "directly" in the
manufacturing process." The supreme court noted that the
limitations which the City of Winchester sought to govern the
case do not appear in section 58.1-1101(A)(2)."
6. Machinery and Tools of Manufacturers
As a fall-back argument, the City of Winchester argued that
even if American Woodmark's personal property is "used in" a
manufacturing business, its computer system and office equip-
ment are "machinery and tools.., of such business" and not
320. Id., 464 S.E.2d at 151-52.
321. Id., 464 S.E.2d at 152 (citing Commonwealth Natural Resources, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va. 529, 537-38, 248 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1978)).
322. Id. at 457, 464 S.E.2d at 152.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id., 464 S.E.2d at 152.
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exempt from personal property tax.326 The City of Winchester
relied upon a portion of section 58.1-1101(A)(2) which states
that "[machinery and tools . . . of [manufacturing] businesses
shall not be defined as intangible personal property for purpos-
es of this chapter and shall be taxed locally as tangible person-
al property according to the applicable provisions of law relative
to such property."" 7 American Woodmark countered this argu-
ment by asserting that its computer system and office equip-
ment located at the corporate headquarters were not "machin-
ery and tools" within the meaning of section 58.1-
1101(A)(2).Y
The supreme court held that American Woodmark's furniture,
fixtures, office equipment and computer equipment are not
"machinery and tools" within the meaning of section 58.1-
1101(A)(2) because these items are not used in connection with
the operation of machinery, which is actually and directly used
in the manufacturing process.3 29 To reach this decision, the
supreme court noted that since 1950, Virginia's Tax Commis-
sioner has opined that the phrase "machinery and tools" con-
tained in section 58.1-1101(A)(2) and its precursors means ma-
chinery used in the actual process of manufacturing.30 The
supreme court also noted that the Virginia Attorney General
has consistently opined that "'machinery and tools used in a
particular manufacturing business' are the machinery and tools
which are necessary in the particular manufacturing business
and which are used in connection with the operation of machin-
ery which is actually and directly used in the manufacturing
process." ' The supreme court also found it persuasive that
the Virginia General Assembly had taken no action to modify
the Attorney General's opinions concerning the definition of
"machinery and tools" for purposes of tangible personal property
326. Id.
327. Id. at 458, 464 S.E.2d at 152.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 458-59, 464 S.E.2d at 153.
330. Id. at 458, 464 S.E.2d at 152 (citing Commonwealth v. Carter, 198 Va. 141,
146-47, 92 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1956) (construction of taxation statute by Tax Commis-
sioner charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight)).
331. Id. (citing 1985-1986 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 316, 317); see also 1987-1988 Atty.
Gen. Ann. Rep. 590.
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taxation.s2 The supreme court noted that the General Assem-
bly is presumed to have knowledge of the Attorney General's
interpretation of statutes, and the General Assembly's failure to
make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in
the Attorney General's interpretation."
B. Recent Significant Legislation
The 1996 General Assembly moved quickly after the decision
in City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp. to adopt
legislation that specifically provides that certain tangible per-
sonal property used in the headquarters of a manufacturing
business be classified as intangible personal property.3"
The 1996 legislature also expanded the local tangible person-
al property tax classification for computer hardware used by
data processing businesses to include programmable computer
equipment owned by all businesses.335 Tangible personal prop-
erty classified in this category will be valued as a percentage of
original cost to the taxpayer or actual fair market value."'
V. BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE TAX
A. Recent Judicial Decisions
At the same time it was litigating the classification of office
furniture, fixtures, equipment and computers used at its corpo-
rate headquarters for Virginia property tax purposes, American
Woodmark was also actively involved in litigation challenging
the City of Winchester's assessments of a local business, profes-
sional and occupational license tax ("BPOL"), which had been
levied against the corporation.337 American Woodmark Corpo-
332. American Woodmark, 250 Va. at 458, 464 S.E.2d at 153.
333. Id. (citing Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62
(1983)); Richard L. Deal & Assoc. v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 622 (1983);
Albemarle County v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 762 (1975)).
334. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101(A)(2) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
335. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3503(A)(16) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
336. Id.
337. City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp, 252 Va. 98, 471 S.E.2d 495
(1996).
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ration argued that Winchester's BPOL license tax violated the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because the
City of Winchester did not fairly apportion the assessments to
tax only those gross receipts attributable to the corporation's
business activities in the City.138 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that the Winchester tax assessments failed the Com-
merce Clause's external consistency test-which requires that
an assessment apply only to the portion of the revenues from
interstate activity that reasonably reflects the in-state compo-
nent of the activity-because the assessments included revenues
realized from value produced in locations other than the taxing
jurisdiction.339
The Winchester Commissioner of Revenue assessed BPOL
taxes against American Woodmark for the years 1990 and 1991
in the amount of $374,636.91 and $343,918.42, respectively.
American Woodmark refused to make payment on these assess-
ments and initiated an application to correct the local BPOL
tax assessments. The issue was whether the City of
Winchester's assessment of BPOL tax based on American
Woodmark's nationwide receipts was valid under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.'
The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the exclusive power
to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States." ' In
particular, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
state or local tax on a business engaged in interstate commerce
violates the Commerce Clause unless the tax: (i) is applied to
an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing jurisdiction;
(ii) is fairly apportioned; (iii) does not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and (iv) is fairly related to the services
provided by the taxing jurisdiction.342 The issue presented by
American Woodmark in its challenge to Winchester's BPOL tax
assessments was the second prong of the Complete Auto Transit
338. Id. at 101, 471 S.E.2d at 497.
339. Id. at 103-04, 471 S.E.2d at 498.
340. Id. at 100, 471 S.E.2d at 496.
341. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
342. American Woodmark, 252 Va. at 101, 471 S.E.2d at 497 (citing Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278 (1977)); see also Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v.
County of Chesterfield, 248 Va. 575, 449 S.E.2d 813 (1994); Short Bros. (USA), Inc. v.
Arlington County, 244 Va. 520, 423 S.E.2d 172 (1992).
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test which requires assessments to satisfy the "fairly appor-
tioned" prong.' This prong requires that an assessment be
both internally and externally consistent.' The United States
Supreme Court stated that an assessment is internally consis-
tent if applying the text of the taxing statute, and assuming
that every other jurisdiction applied the same statute, the tax-
payer would not be subjected to a risk of double taxation.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia also noted that an assessment
is externally consistent if the assessment applies only to the
"'portion of the revenue from the interstate activity which rea-
sonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being
taxed."'
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision which
held that the assessments were internally consistent because if
every taxing jurisdiction applied the taxes set out in the City of
Winchester's ordinance, the taxpayer would be allowed to de-
duct amounts paid to other taxing jurisdictions and therefore
would not be subject to multiple taxation.47 The supreme
court, however, held that the City of Winchester ordinance
failed to pass the external consistency test.M The supreme
court stated that "[t]o prevail in a claim that a tax assessment
fails the external consistency test, a taxpayer must 'demon-
strate that there is no rational relationship between the income
attributable to the state and the interstate values of the enter-
prise."' 9
The City of Winchester argued that the trial court's determi-
nation that the assessments were not externally consistent was
erroneous because American Woodmark failed to meet its bur-
den of proof.350 Winchester argued that the record demonstrat-
ed that American Woodmark was a highly centralized, unitary
business and its corporate headquarters contributed value to its
343. American Woodmark, 252 Va. at 102, 471 S.E.2d at 497.
344. Id.
345. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 497 (citing Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989)).
346. Id. (citing Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262).
347. Id. at 103-04, 471 S.E.2d at 498.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 102, 471 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div.
of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of the Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 75 (1989) (quoting Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180 (1983))).
350. Id. at 103, 471 S.E.2d at 498.
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business.51 Winchester asserted that all of the taxpayer's
gross receipts were in some way attributable to the headquar-
ters office and, presumably, could all be used as the basis for
the BPOL assessments. 52 The supreme court disagreed. 
53
The supreme court stated that American Woodmark was not
required to produce evidence of a specific level of value attribut-
able to its Winchester operation to prevail in its assertion that
the BPOL assessments were not externally consistent.3" The
taxpayer did present uncontested evidence that, during the
years in question, it operated twenty-four facilities in thirteen
different states. These facilities included manufacturing and
distribution centers, as well as service and sales offices. The
supreme court stated that common sense compels the conclusion
that these operations added value to American Woodmark's
business product and were revenue producing activities. 355 The
supreme court concluded that the BPOL assessments were
based on 100% of American Woodmark's revenues, including
revenues realized from value produced in locations other than
in the taxing jurisdiction.356 Given the number of facilities in
operation outside the City of Winchester, the supreme court
stated that the value added to the product by the Winchester
operations could not possibly produce 100% of the revenues."'
In affirming the circuit court decision, the supreme court held
that under the specific facts of this case, Winchester failed to
apportion the BPOL tax assessments as required by the Com-
merce Clause.355
In Fairfax County v. DataComp Corp.,"' the Fairfax County
Circuit Court held that a company which assembles and inte-
grates various pre-made computer parts into completed comput-
ers that are subsequently sold to various governmental agencies
and institutional purchasers qualifies for the exemption from
business, professional and occupational license taxes under
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. 36 Va. Cir. 60 (Fairfax County 1995).
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former section 58.1-3703(B)(4)360 of the Virginia Code.36'
DataComp was in the business of producing and selling per-
sonal computers, file servers and computer parts. In 1988,
DataComp opened a "manufacturing plant" in Fairfax County to
fulfill its obligation under a contract with the United States
Department of Labor. DataComp contracted and provided com-
puter networks to various government agencies, labor unions,
law firms, and "re-sellers."62 In producing its computers,
DataComp acquired various component parts such as
motherboards, power switches, cabling and brackets from
original equipment manufacturers. These individual parts were
tested to insure quality and compatibility with FCC standards.
DataComp technicians then assembled and integrated these
parts into a final product in accordance with contract specifica-
tions. This process included the soldering, taping and connect-
ing of these materials by trained DataComp employees."
Fairfax County initiated a lawsuit demanding payment of
taxes, penalties and interest allegedly owed by DataComp on
delinquent BPOL taxes for the years 1989 through 1993.
DataComp responded that it qualified for the exemption under
Virginia Code section 58.1-3703(B)(4), which provides that no
county shall levy any license tax "[o]n a manufacturer for the
privilege of manufacturing and selling goods, wares and mer-
chandise at wholesale at the place of manufacture."3
Fairfax County alleged that DataComp's business activity did
not constitute manufacturing for purposes of this exemption but
consisted merely of assembly of ready made parts. The County
also argued that DataComp did not sell its computers "at
wholesale" as required by the statutory exemption.
The first issue presented to the circuit court was to deter-
mine whether DataComp qualified as a "manufacturer" for
purposes of section 58.1-3703(B)(4). This requires a two-step
analysis. First, the court must consider whether some of
DataComp's business activities constituted "manufacturing," as
360. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703(B)(4) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
361. Datacomp, 36 Va. Cir. at 67.
362. Id. at 61.
363. Id.
364. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703(B)(4) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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defined by the Supreme Court of Virginia.3" Second, the court
must decide whether these activities, if deemed to be manufac-
turing, meet the test of substantiality. 66
The circuit court held that DataComp's activities did consti-
tute manufacturing.6 ' The evidence at trial showed that
"DataComp's production of its computers involved the trans-
formation and integration of various components into a final
product of substantially different character."" The processes
involved many steps, including integrating parts into a
motherboard and soldering and wiring materials into the sys-
tem. This process also involved integrating control panel switch-
es, disk drives, controller cards, wires and cables, and other
computer parts which could not function as a computer without
the technical expertise of DataComp's employees, who trans-
formed these computer "raw materials" into an integrated sys-
tem which performs the desired tasks.369
Having decided that DataComp performed manufacturing
activities, the circuit court next considered whether such manu-
facturing activities met the test of substantiality set forth in
the County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown BoveriY 9 In deter-
mining whether the manufacturing portion of a business is
substantial, a court must examine a number of factors, in-
cluding:
[1] the manufacturing component's financial receipts, [2] its
proportion of the total corporate income, [3] the percentage
it comprises of the total capital investment, [4] the number
of employees working in the manufacturing component as
compared with the total number of employees, or [5] the
ratio of manufacturing activities to the entire business. 1
365. DataComp, 36 Va. Cir. at 63 (citing County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown
Boveri, 238 Va. 64, 69, 389 S.E.2d 890, 892-93 (1989)).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 65.
368. Id. at 64.
369. Id.
370. 238 Va. 64, 380 S.E.2d 890 (1989).
371. DataComp, 36 Va. Cir. at 65 (quoting Brown Boveri, 238 Va. at 71, 380
S.E.2d at 894).
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The evidence presented to the circuit court demonstrated that
greater than one-half of DataComp's business activity during
the relevant years consisted of the production of computers and
monitors pursuant to government contracts. Approximately
eighty to ninety percent of DataComp's revenue between 1989
and 1990 came from its government contracts. As a result of
this evidence, the circuit court held that DataComp met the
test of substantiality. 72
The circuit court next had to decide whether DataComp's
selling activities were "at wholesale." Fairfax County argued
that DataComp sold the computers and monitors to end-users
which essentially amounted to sales at retail and not at whole-
sale. DataComp responded by asserting that Fairfax County
had assessed its gross receipts tax on DataComp as a "whole-
sale merchant." The circuit court stated that the fact that
DataComp was assessed as a wholesale merchant was some
evidence that its operations involved wholesale sales, but was
not conclusive.373 However, the circuit court stated that the
majority of DataComp's sales were to government agencies
under government contracts. 4 In addition, the remaining
sales to labor unions, law firms, and other organizations were
essentially institutional sales.375
The statutory exemption from BPOL license taxes for manu-
facturers who sell from the place of manufacture treats govern-
mental sales and sales to institutions as being "wholesale in
nature."376 As a result, the circuit court held that DataComp
was entitled to the statutory exemption of Virginia Code section
58.1-3703(B)(4) for its sales to government agencies and institu-
tions.377
In Hampton Nissan Limited Partnership v. City of
Hampton,378 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the City
of Hampton could not retain, as license taxes, payments that a
motor vehicle dealer had collected improperly from motor vehi-
372. Id.
373. 'Id. at 66.
374. Id.
376. Id. at 67.
376. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703(B)(4) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
377. DataComp, 36 Va. Cir. at 67.
378. 251 Va. 100, 466 S.E.2d 95 (1996).
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cle purchasers in excess of the rate prescribed by law.379
Hampton Nissan had improperly charged its customers an
amount in excess of the imposed license tax rate. The Hampton
Commissioner of Revenue requested the motor vehicle dealer to
remit to the City of Hampton the full amount of overpayments.
Hampton Nissan offered to refund the overpayments to its
customers and placed a notice in the local newspaper containing
the offer. The trial court held that Hampton Nissan must pay
over the excess license taxes collected and awarded summary
judgment to the City of Hampton.8 ' Hampton Nissan argued
in its appeal that the City did not have the statutory authority
to collect, under the guise of a tax, the overpayment that
Hampton Nissan had improperly received from its customers.
The motor vehicle dealer asserted that the City may not collect
a tax unless it has specific statutory authority to do so, and
that no such authority existed in this case."8' The City of
Hampton argued that Virginia Code section 58.1-16 and certain
provisions contained in the City's Code provided it with the
express authority to collect the overpayments as license
taxes."2
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the City's assertion
that section 58.1-16 was applicable.3" The BPOL tax at issue
in this case is administered solely by the City, not the Depart-
ment of Taxation or the Division of Motor Vehicles. Accordingly,
the supreme court held that section 58.1-16 had no rele-
vance.3" The supreme court also found no support in the City
of Hampton's ordinances providing express authority to the City
to seek overcollected taxes.3" In reaching this decision, the
supreme court stated that "a city can derive its taxing power
only through positive grants of authority from the General
Assembly, and the City must be able to put its finger on the
statute which confers upon the City the power to tax."386
379. Id. at 103-04, 466 S.E.2d at 97.
380. Id. at 102, 466 S.E.2d at 96.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 102-03, 466 S.E.2d at 96-97.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 103-04, 466 S.E.2d at 97.
386. Id. at 105, 466 S.E.2d at 98.
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Hampton Nissan is very important because the supreme
court provided an analytical framework in which a local tax
jurisdiction must operate. Commissioners of Revenue do not
have any implied authority. They must follow their statutory
authority exactly.
B. Significant Legislative Activity
In 1996, the Virginia General Assembly was able to produce
and pass a major bill to reform the local business, professional
and occupational license ('BPOL") tax. This significant legisla-
tion was based on over three years of spirited. cooperation be-
tween Virginia's business community and their legislators. The
legislative package will bring substantial relief and reform
when the legislation takes effect on January 1, 1997."7
The new statutory scheme calls for the adoption of guidelines
and regulations which ultimately will be published by the De-
partment of Taxation. This process of developing guidelines and
regulations is underway with an expected release in early 1997.
1. Procedural Reforms
The legislation creates a number of administrative procedures
and remedies for taxpayers to contest BPOL assessments. Un-
der the legislation, local governments will be able to retain a
great deal of flexibility including the ability to tax or not tax
particular businesses and to tax at rates less than the statutory
ceilings. For the first time, however, there will be uniform ad-
ministration of this tax throughout the Commonwealth. This
should eliminate complaints about inconsistent and arbitrary
administration of the BPOL tax in certain localities. The key
features producing this uniformity of administration are as fol-
lows:
(1) Guidelines or regulations and advisory written opinions by
the Virginia Department of Taxation;388
387. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3700, -3700.1, -3701, -3703, -3703.1, -3706, -
3708, -3732 (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1996). The BPOL legislation package also
repealed §§ 58.1-3707. Act of April 6, 1996, dhs. 715, 720 1996 Va. Acts 1233, 1247.
388. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3701 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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(2) Administrative appeals to the Virginia Department of
Taxation from adverse decisions by the local Commissioner of
Revenue;389
(3) No collection of tax pending final administrative determi-
nation;3
0
(4) Interest on refunds;391
(5) Single ten percent penalty for late filing of return and
late payment of tax;
392
(6) Procedures to extend filing date and to extend statute of
limitations for assessments and payments;393
(7) Procedure for obtaining advance rulings.394
2. Substantive Reforms
The substantive reforms of the 1996 BPOL legislation seek to
retain the basic theory of the BPOL tax and provide specific
rules as to where gross receipts are deemed taxable.
One of the most frequent criticisms of the BPOL tax was the
way in which localities administered the tax. Many localities
applied the BPOL tax as a gross income tax. Certain localities
treated the existence of any local office or other tax nexus as
giving rise to a presumption of taxability with respect to world-
wide gross income.395 An underlying principle of the legislation
is to destroy such overreaching applications by certain localities.
This concept is found in section 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a):
General Rule: Whenever the tax imposed by this ordinance
is measured by gross receipts, the gross receipts included in
the taxable measure shall be only those gross receipts at-
389. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(5)(c) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
390. VA- CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(5)(b), (d) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
391. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(2)(e) (Cun. Supp. 1996).
392. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
393. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(2)(c), (4) (Curn. Supp. 1996).
394. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(5)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
395. See City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 252 Va. 98, 471 S.E.2d
(1996); supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
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tributed to the exercise of a privilege subject to licensure at
a definite place of business within this jurisdiction ...."
The BPOL legislative reform package makes it clear that the
BPOL tax is a privilege tax, not an income tax, and that items
of income unrelated to the taxed privilege are not included in
the tax base. 97 Section 58.1-3703.1(A)(6) provides that the
assessor's burden is to establish that "a particular receipt is
directly attributable to the taxable privilege exercised within
this jurisdiction."39 Income attributable to a definite place of
business in another jurisdiction cannot be taxed even if that
other jurisdiction does not tax them.399 Items of income unre-
lated to the taxable privilege cannot be taxed. The most obvious
example should be investment income in the case of businesses
other than brokerages, banks, savings and loan institutions,
and other financial service organizations."°
Another area of concern to the business community involves
the tax status of business locations that do not generate gross
receipts from dealing with the general public. Comments by the
Virginia Department of Taxation during the legislative process
indicate that such "administrative facilities" will not be deemed
to be engaged in a taxable privilege.4"' Thus, corporate head-
quarters, training centers, administrative facilities and other of-
fices that do not directly generate gross receipts from transac-
tions with the general public should be exempt from the BPOL
tax.
402
The BPOL reform legislation will change the entire audit
approach of local tax authorities. Where previously some Com-
missioners of Revenue audited on a "prove it is not taxable"
basis, the statutory burden now will require the assessor to
396. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
397. See id.
398. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703(A)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
399. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
400. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(A)(8) ((Cum. Supp. 1996) (exclusion for invest-
ment income).
401. Hearings on H.B. 293 Before House Finance Comm. and Senate Finance
Comm., Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (unpublished).
402. See, e.g., BPOL Guidelines § 2.2(A)(4) (Va. Dept. Tax., July 1, 1995).
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demonstrate that particular receipts are related to business
activities conducted locally.403
3. Situs Rules
In determining where receipts are taxable, the "uniform ordi-
nance" provisions contained in the new legislation set forth
specific rules and, in appropriate situations, apportionment
procedures. The basic rules under new Virginia Code section
58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a) include the following:
(1) Construction contractor gross receipts will be taxable at
the job site;4°4
(2) Retail merchant gross receipts will be taxable where sales
solicitation activities occur; 5
(3) Wholesale merchant gross receipts will be taxable where
the goods are delivered to customers; 48
(4) Tangible personal property rentals will be taxable at the
lessor's office;407
(5) Services will be taxable at the office or definite place of
business of the taxpayer at which the services are performed or
are directed.0 8
When a taxpayer has multiple offices, the statutory rule
clearly provides the opportunity to trace receipts to a particular
office.4"9 If adequate records are not available to permit that,
the statute also permits the gross receipts to be apportioned
based on a payroll factor reflecting the involvement of all the
taxpayer's offices working on the contract.410
403. See id.
404. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
405. VA_ CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
406. Id.
407. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
408. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
409. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
410. Id.
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4. Exemptions
The legislation provides for various exemptions from the
BPOL tax and, in certain circumstances, places restrictions on
localities' authority to impose the tax. Several of these exemp-
tions or exclusions are duplicative of other provisions of the law
or reflect current practice in some localities. However, the ex-
emptions or exclusions listed in the statute should facilitate
taxpayer understanding and compliance by the localities. Sever-
al of the more critical new statutory BPOL exemptions include
the following:
(1) Certain charities exempt from income tax under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code411 except for "unrelated
trade or business income;"
42
(2) Gifts, contributions and membership dues of nonprofit
organizations;413
(3) Venture capital funds (but commissions and fees of fund
managers are taxable);414
(4) Receipts from the conversion of one asset to another to
the extent the amount has previously been taxed (for example,
factoring of accounts receivable);41
(5) Proceeds received by the obligor from loan transac-
tions;4
16
(6) Returns of principal or basis upon the sale of a capital
asset;
417
(7) Rebates, discounts and other reductions in purchase
price;
(8) Withdrawals from inventory and occasional sales-"
411. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
412. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703(C)(18)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
413. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703(C)(18)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
414. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703(C)(19) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
415. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
416. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
417. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
418. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(A)(16) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
419. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(A)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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(9) Investment income from taxpayers not engaged in a finan-
cial service business.420
For multi-state businesses, the most important exemption
may be that provided by section 58.1-3732(B)(2), which allows a
deduction for "[amny receipts attributable to business conducted
in another state or foreign country in which the taxpayer is
liable for an income or other tax based upon income."421
4. Small Business Exemption
A concerted effort was made by the Virginia business commu-
nity and the legislature to eliminate the BPOL tax that may be
imposed by localities for small businesses. The result was the
establishment of statutory thresholds geared to the annual
gross receipts of the business.
The BPOL tax may be imposed by localities if annual gross
receipts exceed the threshold amounts for the population ranges
indicated in the table below:
Threshold Amount Population
No threshold Below 25,000
$50,000 Between 25,000 and 50,000
$100,000 Over 50,000422
The BPOL reform legislation also establishes an annual li-
cense fee schedule. A license fee may be charged to all busi-
nesses, including those with gross receipts less than the
threshold, as follows:
Maximum Fee Population
$30 Below 25,000
$50 Between 25,000 and 50,000
$100 ($50 by 1/1/2000) Over 50,00041
420. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(A)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
421. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 996).
422. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3706(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
423. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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VI. REAL PROPERTY TAX
A. Recent Judicial Decisions
In DKM Richmond Associates, L.P. v. City of Richmond,4"
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the City of Richmond
could reduce the amount of a tax credit granted for property
which was substantially rehabilitated by the taxpayer where
the building's value decreased when it was subsequently reas-
sessed.4" During the third year of the five-year tax credit pe-
riod, the value of the building decreased while the value of the
land remained the same. The City of Richmond decreased the
amount of tax credit to reflect the decline in the building's
value. DKM, the taxpayer, objected to the reduced tax credit,
arguing that the credit could not be altered during the five-year
credit time period.426 The taxpayer argued that the "plain lan-
guage of the [o]rdinance demonstrates that the legislative intent
was to grant the taxpayer a credit based on the improvements
that he added to his property, and the value of these im-
provements to the taxpayer is fixed at the time of making the
improvements."42
The supreme court upheld the City of Richmond's reduction
of the tax credit." The supreme court noted that the rehabili-
tation tax credit was a partial exemption from taxation and
was not intended to apply to the value of the land or to the im-
provements that existed before the rehabilitation effort. 429 The
tax credit was held to be available for the limited purpose of
offsetting a specific portion of the total assessment on the prop-
erty, to-wit: the portion resulting from the rehabilitation.3
In Seaone v. Board of Supervisors,43 ' the Fairfax County
Circuit Court held that the owner of a shopping center plaza
424. 249 Va. 401, 457 S.E.2d 76 (1995).
425. Id. at 407-08, 457 S.E.2d at 80.
426. Id. at 406, 457 S.E.2d at 79.
427. Id. at 407, 457 S.E.2d at 79.
428. Id. at 407-08, 457 S.E.2d at 80.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 408-09, 457 S.E.2d at 80.
431. 35 Va. Cir. 351 (Fairfax County 1995).
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met his burden of proof in demonstrating that Fairfax County
did not take into consideration the actual rents from the shop-
ping center when it determined the "economic rent" for purpos-
es of real estate tax assessments of the shopping center for the
years 1989 through 1992.2 Unfortunately for the landowner,
the circuit court also held that the landowner did not present
sufficient evidence to enable the court to correct the real estate
assessments. 3 Therefore, the circuit court was not able to
provide the landowner any relief.'
The taxpayer owned a strip shopping center which housed
two "anchor" tenants and approximately sixteen smaller tenants
in Fairfax County. In 1969, anticipating the construction of the
shopping center, the taxpayer entered into two anchor leases
with two large tenants, each covering a base period of twenty
years. Both leases contained several five-year extension option
periods. In exchange for receiving long-term leases on the new
strip shopping center from the anchor tenants, the taxpayer
agreed to a reasonable annual rent fee which ultimately became
below fair market value rent in the later years of the lease
agreements. 5
For the years 1989 through 1992, Fairfax County assessed
the strip shopping center plaza. The landowner was particularly
upset that the assessed value of the strip shopping center was
increased by forty-three percent between 1989 and 1990.
Fairfax County used the capitalization of income approach to
appraise the income-producing strip shopping center proper-
ty."8 The landowner challenged Fairfax County's tax assess-
ments, contending that the County failed to take the shopping
center's actual rents into account when determining economic
rent for purposes of assessing the shopping center for the rele-
vant tax years. Both the taxpayer and the County agreed that
the County's appraisers used a proper methodology to value the
shopping center. 7 The taxpayer challenged; however, the
County's appraiser used the amount of rent for which space in
432. Id. at 363.
433. Id. at 365-66.
434. Id.
.435. Id. at 353-54.
436. Id. at 354.
437. Id. at 352.
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the income-producing property could have been leased for in the
years 1989-1992. This potential rent is referred to as "economic
rent."
The Fairfax County assessments were based upon an inde-
pendent appraisal prepared by use of the capitalization of in-
come method. The County's appraiser used summarized infor-
mation contained in the County Assessor's Office and looked at
"comparable" shopping centers to determine what the appropri-
ate "gross economic rent" would be for the subject strip shop-
ping center. The Fairfax County Circuit Court looked at the
County's field data cards for the subject property and noticed
that actual rent figures only appeared on the 1991 and 1992
field data cards."3 No actual rent information was in Fairfax
County's possession for the 1989 and 1990 tax years. No such
actual rent information was ever relied upon by the County's
appraisers."
The circuit court held that the shopping center landowner
sustained his burden of demonstrating that Fairfax County did
not take actual rents into account in appraising the shopping
center for the 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992 tax years.' The
evidence presented during the trial showed that the Fairfax
County appraisers did not have information as to actual rents
for the 1989 and 1990 tax years, and therefore could not have
taken actual rents into account when making their appraisals.
Fairfax County also did not use actual rents for 1991 and 1992
but instead used assumed economic rents for those latter two
years. Fairfax County did have actual rent information for 1991
and 1992.
The County's 1990 appraisal for the shopping center was
forty-three percent higher than the appraisal for the previous
year, an increase of over three million dollars. The evidence
introduced at trial showed that this jump occurred because of
the County's assumption that economic rents jumped by forty-
three percent between 1989 and 1990, despite the fact that: (1)
commercial real estate in the region was suffering an unprece-
dented decline; and (2) the County had no actual rent and
438. Id. at 355.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 362.
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expense information for the two years involved."' Testimony
at trial did show that rents for the shopping center were ap-
proximately the same for 1989, 1990 and 1991.
Once the trial court held that the assessments were improp-
er, it noted that Virginia Code section 58.1-3987 authorizes a
circuit court to correct an assessment in the event a taxing
authority has erroneously assessed real estate."' In granting
such relief, the circuit court does not have authority to remand
the case to the taxing authorities for a new assessment, but
must "grant appropriate relief based upon the evidence before
it."
4 4 3
The taxpayer argued that the testimony of its appraisers
constituted sufficient evidence. The circuit court disagreed hold-
ing that one of the shopping center landowner's appraisers only
testified as to value for the 1992 tax year. 4 In addition, this
appraisal was made for purposes of a bank. The circuit court
stated the other appraiser's testimony was not persuasive."
As a result, the Fairfax County Circuit Court reluctantly con-
cluded that it was unable to afford the taxpayer any relief.'
In reaching this unfortunate decision, the circuit court stated
that
[n]either the Code of Virginia, nor any precedent presented
by the parties, suggests that this Court is authorized to as-
sess the value of the [shopping c]enter on any basis other
than the evidence presented at trial. Since I find
[taxpayer's] evidence insufficient to correct the County's
assessments, he has failed to sustain his ultimate burden of
proof. 7
441. Id. at 363.
442. Id. at 365.
443. Id. (citing Smith v. Board of Supervisors, 234 Va. 250, 255, 361 S.E.2d 351,
353 (1987)).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 365-66.
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B. Recent Significant Legislation: Exemption for Substantially
Renovated or Rehabilitated Property and Tax Credit
In 1978, the Virginia Constitution was amended to include a
new authorization for localities to provide for the partial exemp-
tion from real estate taxes for real property that has been sub-
stantially renovated, rehabilitated, or replaced because of age or
use.' Virginia Code section 58.1-3220 deals with rehabilitat-
ed residential real estate 9 and section 58.1-3221 covers re-
habilitated commercial and industrial real estate."0
By local option, localities may exempt certain rehabilitated
residential and commercial real estate. 1 Prior to July 1,
1995, any residential, commercial or industrial structure which
is less than twenty-five years of age and undergoes any sub-
stantial rehabilitation, renovation or replacement may receive a
partial exemption from real estate taxes by the local taxing
jurisdiction.f 2 The partial exemption to be provided by the
local governing body "may be an amount equal to the increase
in assessed value or a percentage of such increase resulting
from the rehabilitation, renovation or replacement of the struc-
ture, as determined by the Commissioner of Revenue or other
assessing officer. . . ."' The amount of exemption may be up
to fifty percent of the cost of the rehabilitation, renovation or
replacement as established by local ordinance.' The partial
exemption is available upon the completion of the rehabilita-
tion, renovation or replacement or on January 1 of the year
following the completion of such rehabilitation, renovation or
replacement.455 The partial exemption was available for a pe-
riod of ten years.5 6
The 1995 General Assembly amended sections 58.1-3220 and
448. VA_ CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3220, -3221 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (implementing VA.
CONST. art. , § 6(h)).
449. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3220 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
450. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
451. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
452. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3220(A), -3221(A) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
453. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3220(B), -3221(B) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
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58.1-3221 to make two significant changes to these partial ex-
emption real estate tax statutes. The first change revises the
age of a structure or improvement in order to be eligible for the
partial exemption from real estate taxes. For residential struc-
tures, a building that is fifteen years of age or older and under-
goes substantial rehabilitation, renovation or replacement would
be eligible for the partial exemption.457 Commercial industrial
structures of at least twenty years of age, or fifteen years of
age if the structure is located in an area designated as a Vir-
ginia enterprise zone, would be eligible for the partial exemp-
tion from real estate taxes once the substantial rehabilitation,
renovation or replacement is completed.5 8
The second significant change concerns the length of time for
which the partial exemption is available. For residential,
commercial or industrial structures, the partial exemption from
real estate taxes would be available for fifteen years.459 This
represents an additional five years of partial exemption eligi-
bility.46 °
The 1996 General Assembly added a new section to the tax
credit scheme for certain rehabilitated, renovated or re-
placement of residential structures.46' Virginia Code section
58.1-3220.01 permits localities, by ordinance, to provide for local
real property tax credits equal to property tax liens which do
not exceed fifty percent of the assessed value of the applicant's
property at the time of purchase.46' The credit is available on-
ly to owners of rehabilitated, renovated or replacement residen-
tial structures at least fifteen years old and may be used by the
owner to offset real property taxes assessed against such prop-
erty.4' The local tax credit will only be available to property
owners who purchase a structure which at the time of purchase
contains property tax liens exceeding fifty percent of the
property's assessed value. 464 The locality may also include in
457. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3220(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
458. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
459. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3220(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
460. Id.
461. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3220.01 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
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its ordinance multi-family residential units which have been
substantially rehabilitated by replacement for multi-family
use.
46
465. Id.
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